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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is dedicated to the study of Complex Network Theory with applications in 
power systems. The focus of the study is to analyze and solve power system problems by 
treating and modelling it as a network and applying the concepts from this theory. The 
work can be broadly classified into two parts: vulnerability analysis and fault location. 
 Two different centrality indices are proposed to analyze power system 
vulnerabilities. The first method utilizes shortest path betweenness approach and a 
centrality index is defined based on the power flow equation using reactance as the 
measure of portion of power flowing through any line. A few limitations of this method 
are improved in the second, where power system is considered to be capacitated and 
directed in any steady state and another centrality index based on the maximum flow 
algorithm is defined using admittance as weight to model the network. Based on 
Kirchhoff’s law, admittances are considered to be a measure of proportion and ease with 
which current or power flows through any line. Further, using maximum flow algorithm, 
lines are marked as important based on the fraction of total flow they carry between 
nodes. It is demonstrated by simulations on the IEEE 39 and IEEE 118 bus systems that 
failure of transmission lines identified as critical or vulnerable has a major impact on the 
efficiency and performance of the network, unlike the failure of random connections 
which have little or no effect. 
 In another study, cascading failures in power systems are assessed using line 
outage distribution factor and power transfer distribution factor together with Complex 
 XIV 
Network Theory. This work identifies the group of transmission lines which may be 
affected if any one line fails and investigates the sequence and depth to which the failure 
may propagate. Using the IEEE 14 bus system, it explains how the failure of one line can 
sometimes lead to a cascading failure and eventual blackout. 
 The next part of the research applies Complex Network Theory together with 
travelling wave based fault location techniques to locate faults in power systems. This 
study is further divided into two parts. The first part analyzes a power generation 
network, where the double-ended travelling wave theory is used to calculate the time 
stamp of fault transients at each node and then network topology of the system is used to 
first identify the faulty link and then calculate the fault distance. Finally, the single-ended 
travelling wave method is used to locate faults in power distribution systems. Due to the 
radial structure of transmission lines in such systems, more than one fault candidates may 
appear in the calculations, out of which only one is real. This ambiguity is resolved by 
taking advantage of the spanning tree like structure and using depth first search to 
identify the actual fault. The results reveal that the proposed methodologies are capable 
of locating single faults in power systems with reasonable accuracy. 
 All the proposed algorithms and methodologies are verified and validated on 
IEEE standard power networks. The software’s used for simulation are MATLAB, 
Graphviz, an open source visualization project from AT&T research and Alternate 
Transients Program/Electromagnetic Transients Program (ATP/EMTP). 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 OVERVIEW 
This chapter gives an overall background and the purpose of this research work. Section 
1.3 introduces network science along with its brief history and applications. A brief 
background of power system is given in Section 1.4. This section describes a power 
system and also relates it to complex networks. Further, Section 1.5 discusses the 
motivation and scope for this research study. Next in Section 1.6, the objectives and 
contributions of this research are highlighted. Finally, the chapter concludes with the 
structure of this thesis in Section 1.7. 
 
1.2 PROLOGUE 
Power systems, (also called electric grids), support the generation, transmission and 
distribution operations of electricity. The future of electric grids lies in the capability to 
deliver electricity from suppliers to consumers using digital technology to save energy, 
reduce cost and increase reliability, and furthermore, assist reduction in greenhouse gas 
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emissions. Such so called smart grids are being promoted by many governments as a way 
of addressing energy independence or global warming issues. 
The heavy reliance of modern industries on electricity and the day-to-day increase 
in demand is making power systems a very critical part of our lives. Like any other 
system, power networks can be vulnerable to attacks and failures. In some cases, the 
faults can result in cascading failure and eventual blackouts. This causes inconvenience 
to consumers and huge financial loss to power utilities. In order to maintain high quality 
of customer service, it is essential to minimize such problems and fix them quickly if they 
occur. Therefore, intensive research is needed to study the robustness and vulnerability of 
a power network. 
 Complex Network Theory has bee studied extensively in recent years due to its 
potential for solving large scale practical problems. Many practical complex systems in 
the world can be modelled and described in the form of a complex network, such as 
biological systems, social networks and technological networks, which display 
substantial topological features.  
The latest developments in this area of study have provided a new direction to 
power system research. Based on this theory a power system can be modelled as a graph 
with nodes and vertices and further analysis can help in identifying the critical lines and 
locating faults. Current research is an effort to add knowledge to the existing techniques 
for structural vulnerability analysis of a power networks. The thesis is devoted to the 
study of vulnerability analysis and fault location is power systems using Complex 
Network Theory. 
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1.3 NETWORK SCIENCE [1] 
The emerging science of Complex Network Theory (CNT) is really quite old having its 
roots in the 1700’s. Essentially this theory reemerged with more practical applications in 
mathematics and engineering in the late 1990’s. However, graph theory has been applied 
to practical problems since its inception in 1736, when Swiss mathematician Leonhard 
Euler solved the problem of circumnavigating the bridges of Konigsberg in the best way 
using graph theory. Reference [1] gives the historical timeline of significant events in the 
development of network theory. 
 In 1960’s and 1970’s, the CNT was used by researchers in social science to model 
social networks to study the behaviour of humans in groups. Stanley Milgram’s famous 
‘six degrees of separation’ experiment [2] suggested that any two people selected 
randomly were separated from each other by approximately six (or less) intermediate 
connections. He is credited with the introduction of idea of small world networks which 
stimulated the studies of how network topology might affect human behaviour and vice 
versa.  
 The next big step for network science was in 1990’s when scientists in other 
research fields started to use network models to study and understand biological and 
other physical phenomena. Mathematicians and engineers came up with different models 
like, regular, random, small world and scale free networks in an attempt to explain the 
functionality and behaviour of complex real world systems [3][4].  The modern network 
theory includes the static as well as the dynamic properties. The static properties relate to 
the topology of the system and the dynamic properties explain the function or behaviour. 
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 The past few years have witnessed dramatic advances in this field of science 
which have been motivated by several factors. Firstly, the technological developments 
and computerization of data acquisition has led to more information and large databases 
on the topology of various real networks. Secondly, the increased computational power 
allows us to deal with huge networks and investigate millions of nodes. Third is the 
noticeable meltdown of differences between various disciplines of network science 
research. This allows researchers to access diverse range of databases and information to 
uncover generic properties of such complex systems. Finally, the need to look beyond 
boundaries and try to model and understand the behaviour of systems as a whole [4]. 
Table 1.1 lists and describes some of the many applications of CNT [4]. 
Table 1.1 Applications of Complex Network Theory 
Network Description 
World Wide Web 
World Wide Web represents the largest network for which the 
topological information is not known. The web pages are the nodes 
and the hyperlinks which point to these pages are the edges. They 
are an example of scale free network. 
Internet 
Internet is a network of physical connections between computer and 
other communication devices. This network is studied at two 
different levels. At the router level, routers are the nodes and the 
physical connections between them are edges. At the inter-domain 
or system level, a group of routers, computers etc. represent one 
node and an edge is drawn between two domains if there is at least 
one route between them. 
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Movie actor 
collaboration 
network 
This is a much studied network based on the internet movie 
database. In this network, the actors are the nodes and two nodes 
have a connection if the actors corresponding to those nodes have 
acted together in any movie. 
Science 
collaboration 
network 
This network is similar to the movie actor network except that here 
the nodes are scientists and researchers and they have a connection 
between them if they have written an article together. 
The web of human 
contacts 
This network studies the human relationships. The human beings 
are the nodes in such networks and there is an edge between two 
nodes if they communicate or socialize in any way. One of the 
applications of studying such networks is to understand and prevent 
disease spread. 
Cellular networks 
This is a biological network and studies the organisms representing 
the domains of life. In this network, different substrates are the 
nodes and directed chemical reactions in which these substrates 
participate form the edges. 
Ecological 
networks 
One of the classic examples of ecological network is the food web 
which is studied by ecologist to quantify the interaction between 
various species. The various species form the nodes and the 
predator-prey relationship between them defines the edge. 
Phone call 
networks 
This is a classic example of directed network where the various 
phone numbers are the nodes and every connected call is an edge 
which is directed from the caller to the receiver. 
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Citation networks 
This is another example of directed graph where all the scientific 
publications stand for nodes and an edge represents a reference to a 
previously published article. 
Networks in 
linguistics 
The complexity of human languages have been defined and studied 
by complex networks. The words are modelled as nodes and they 
are linked to each other if they appear next to or one word apart 
from each other. 
Protein folding  
This is another example of biological network in which different 
states of protein are studied. Each distinct protein state forms a 
node and any two states are linked if they can be obtained from 
each other by an elementary process. 
Power networks 
A power grid is a classic example of small world network although 
few consider it to be scale free too. In these networks, generators, 
bus bars, loads, transformer, substations etc can be modelled as 
nodes and the transmission lines connecting them are considered to 
be edges. Current study relates to the modelling, vulnerability 
analysis and fault location in power systems using CNT.  
 
1.4 POWER SYSTEMS 
A power system can be defined as a network of electrical components used to generate, 
transmit and supply electrical power. On the very basic level, a power system comprises 
of a power plant where electrical power is generated, transmission sub-station where 
electricity is stepped-up to the transmission voltage level, high voltage transmission lines 
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used to transmit power to distribution sub-stations where it is stepped down to 
distribution level. From there, power is transmitted over low voltage distribution lines to 
consumers where is stepped down to supply voltage before being distributed to industries 
and homes. Figure 1.1 shows the schematic of a typical power system [5]. 
  
 
Figure 1.1 Schematic of a Simple Power System [5] 
 
There are different types of power generation plants like thermal plants, hydro 
plants, nuclear plants, solar, wind etc. They all have different mechanisms and control 
strategies. Similarly, there are a variety of loads too like household consumers, 
commercial offices and building, small-scale industries, large-scale industries etc. When 
all of these are put together, it starts to form a very complex network as shown in Figure 
1.2 [6]. 
Based on the function and location in the network, each component which forms 
either node or edge has different vulnerability level. Failure of some of them can have a 
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large impact on the whole system while failure of others might have small or no effect. In 
order to have a safe and reliable system, it is important to assess the vulnerability of each 
element and monitor them accordingly. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Schematic of a Power Network [6] 
 
1.4.1 Power System as a Complex Network 
Figure 1.3 gives the one line diagram of the New York State electric power grid [7]. The 
generators, bus bars, loads etc. are modelled as nodes and the connecting transmission 
lines are modelled as edges. As can be seen, there are hundreds of nodes and thousands of 
kilometers of transmissions lines and on top of that the whole system is very dynamic in 
nature. Just to give an idea of the complexity such networks: U.S. power transmission 
grid consists of about 300,000 km of lines operated by around 500 companies [8]. A 
power system is generally considered to be a small-world network [9] which means that 
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even if the network size is large, the average distance between nodes is small. However, 
there are some others who consider it to be a scale-free network [10][11]. 
 As it was mentioned earlier, it is important to assess the vulnerability of such 
networks for safe and reliable functioning of the system. However, looking at the 
complexity of the whole system, it is practically not possible nor would it be economical 
to monitor it. Hence, it is desirable to identify few of those critical elements whose failure 
can seriously affect the functioning of the system and focus the extra resources on them 
for added security and reliability. 
 
Figure 1.3 New York State Electric Power Grid [7] 
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1.5 MOTIVATION AND SCOPE 
1.5.1 Motivation 
Complex Network Theory has significant applications in social, biological and other 
similar networks and now it is making its way into power system study with more and 
more researchers applying this theory for modelling and analysis in this field. Although, 
better models are emerging with advancement in power system research, it is still at an 
early stage and there is a lot of scope for improvement. There needs to be improvements 
to incorporate the real dynamic electrical characteristics along with topological properties 
so as to enable researchers to do a more accurate structural vulnerability and reliability 
assessment. 
Researchers have come up with various models to analyze the vulnerability and 
explain cascading failures. However, not much has been done in identifying the critical 
elements of the network. The failure of these components has a larger impact on the 
performance of the whole system. If they can be identified then the overall system 
security and reliability can be increased by focusing resources on them and monitoring 
them.  
Power transmission lines are one of the key components of such systems. They 
help in transferring power from the generation to distribution station and from 
distribution sub-stations to consumers. These lines can experience faults due to electrical 
or physical breakdown which could cause interruption to reliable power supply. Some of 
these lines are more important than others either due to their location in the network or 
due to the load they carry. If these important lines fail then the efficiency of the whole 
system can drop significantly. This research is motivated by identification of such critical 
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and vulnerable lines using few concepts from CNT. This part of the study also assesses 
the cascading failures in power systems using network science and some existing models 
for such failures. 
Another aim of this research is to study the location of faults using CNT together 
with traditional fault location methodologies. There has been extensive research in 
identifying and locating faults but few have looked at the network topology to achieve the 
goals. So, part of this research work is dedicated to studying the network topology and 
using concepts from network theory to locate faults. 
 
1.5.2 Research Scope 
The first part of this thesis is dedicated to identification of vulnerable lines in power 
networks using the concepts from power system and CNT. A power system is modelled 
as a network, where generators, bus bars, loads, substations etc. are modelled as nodes 
and power transmission lines are modelled as the connecting edges. However, a power 
system is very dynamic in nature so it is difficult to consider all the electrical and 
topological properties at the same time. Hence, the network is modelled using connection 
adjacency matrix and then weights are applied using the transmission line parameters to 
feed some of the static electrical properties. 
 The second part of the thesis is devoted to fault location. There are several 
existing fault location techniques but travelling waves based fault location methodology 
was found suitable to combine with the network topology. The fault location, for single 
fault at a time, is studied for both power transmission and distribution systems.  
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All the methodologies are demonstrated and validated by software simulations 
using Alternate Transients Program/Electromagnetic Transients Program (ATP/EMTP) 
software MATLAB programming. 
 
1.6 THESIS OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
1.6.1 Objectives 
The overall goals of this thesis can be broadly classified in to two parts: 
 Vulnerability analysis of power systems 
 Fault location in power systems 
The common factor is the use of Complex Network Theory to model such systems and 
then using some concepts from this network science together with power system study to 
achieve the goals. The individual goals of this study can be listed as below: 
 To model a power system using complex network theory so as to 
incorporate the topological features of the network as well as its electrical 
properties. 
 To identify the vulnerable and critical lines of any power network using 
concepts from CNT. 
 To investigate the performance of the network under random failures and 
when the lines identified as critical fail. 
 To assess the cascading failures in power systems using network theory. 
 To locate faults in power transmission and distribution systems using 
conventional fault location techniques together with network theory. 
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1.6.2 Contributions 
In brief, the contributions of this research study can be summarized as below: 
 A power system is modelled as a network using connection adjacency matrix. The 
electrical properties are incorporated using the transmission line parameters as the 
weights on the connecting links. In one method, power flow model for lossless 
line is utilized to propose reactance as a way to weight the network. 
 A novel betweenness centrality index is proposed to identify the vulnerable lines 
in a power network. The algorithm weights the connection matrix using the 
reactance of the line and uses the shortest path betweenness approach to identify 
the important lines. 
 A new centrality index is proposed based on the maximum flow through a 
network. A power system is modelled as directed and capacitated and then 
maximum flow algorithm is used to identify the lines which carry maximum 
portion of the total flow through the network. These lines are classified as critical. 
 It is demonstrated using preferential removal of connection (random and targeted 
attacks) that failure of lines identified as vulnerable, have a greater impact on the 
performance of the network, as compared to random line failures. 
 A new algorithm is proposed to study the cascading failures in power network 
using correlation of lines. The algorithm predicts the group of lines which might 
be affected by the failure of any one of them. It also investigates the order in 
which they might fail and the depth to which a failure might penetrate. 
Introduction 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 14 
 A new algorithm is proposed to locate faults in power transmission networks. The 
methodology combines the traditional double-ended travelling wave based fault 
location techniques together with network theory. 
 A new methodology is proposed to locate faults in radial power distribution lines. 
The methodology uses the conventional single-ended travelling wave based fault 
location technique together with network spanning tree to isolate the actual fault 
location from a number of fault candidates, which might occur in the calculation 
due to the radial structure of the network. 
 
1.7 STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
This thesis is structured into seven chapters. A preview of the chapters is outlined as 
below: 
Chapter 1 gives a background to the problem of this research. It introduces complex 
systems and the various models which exist. Next, it describes a power system and 
introduces it as a complex network. Further, it outlines the motivation and scope of this 
research. Finally, the research objectives and contributions of this study are highlighted 
toward the end of this chapter. 
Chapter 2 presents the overall literature review of the research undertaken. It starts with 
some basic concepts of CNT. Then, it does a survey of measurement parameters and 
concepts which are utilized in this study. Next, it discusses the vulnerability and 
robustness of complex networks and possible ways to assess them. Further, it explains the 
vulnerability and cascading failures in power systems, followed by a comprehensive 
literature survey of work done by other researchers. Final part of the chapter discusses the 
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various fault location techniques in power systems and a literature survey of the work 
done in the past. 
Chapter 3 presents the vulnerability assessment of power networks using the shortest 
path betweenness approach. A new betweenness index is proposed using the reactance of 
transmission line as the matrix weight based on the power flow model for a lossless line. 
It has been shown that if the lines identified as vulnerable are disconnected then the 
efficiency of the network drops significantly unlike random failures which have less 
effect. 
Chapter 4 presents another novel approach to analyze the vulnerability of power 
networks. In this study, a power network is modelled using the admittance of the 
transmission line as the matrix weight. Further, the maximum flow based centrality 
approach is used to index the lines based on the portion of power flow they carry through 
the network. It is shown that some of the lines carry significantly higher portion of flow 
as compared to others and they are classified as important and vulnerable. It is 
demonstrated that the removal of lines identified as critical have a much higher impact on 
the performance of the network as compared to random line disconnections. It is also 
shown that the failure of random lines cause little load shift to adjacent lines whereas, the 
outage of critical lines have a huge load shift throughout the network which could 
potentially lead to cascading failures. 
Chapter 5 introduces a new algorithm to study the cascading failure in power networks. 
It uses the theories such as the power transfer distribution factor (PTDF) and line outage 
distribution factor (LODF), which assess the load shifting on power transmission lines 
due to outages. These concepts are used together with CNT to predict the group of lines 
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which might be affected due to the failure of any one and the order in which they might 
fail. Few other parameters of fragility and robustness are defined and measured. 
Chapter 6 presents two new approaches to locate faults in power systems. In both the 
studies power systems are modelled as networks. Further in the first part, the double-
ended travelling wave based theory is used together with network topology to propose an 
algorithm to identify faulty link and locate faults in power transmission networks. In the 
second part, the single-ended travelling wave based theory is combined with the network 
spanning tree to locate faults in radial power distribution lines. 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by discussing the contributions of this research. Finally, it 
recommends some possible directions for future study. 
In addition to the main text, the thesis includes a bibliography to cite other 
relevant works and a list of conference and journal papers published during the course of 
this research. 
 
1.8 SUMMARY 
This chapter has introduced complex systems and discussed the various existing models. 
It has also described a power system and discussed some of the problems which need 
attention and how they can be addressed using Complex Network Theory. Further, it has 
briefly highlighted the motivations and scope of this research and listed the main 
contributions. Finally, the thesis structure and main contents of each chapter is briefly 
outlined towards the end. 
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 OVERVIEW 
This chapter gives a comprehensive literature survey of the existing technologies and 
work done by other researchers until now. It mainly covers preliminaries of complex 
systems, vulnerability analysis of power systems and fault location. Section 2.1 starts 
with some basic concepts of complex networks and fundamentals of measurement 
parameters which are relevant to this study. Next, a power system is introduced in 
Section 2.3 along with a few modelling techniques. Section 2.4 discusses the 
vulnerabilities and robustness of complex systems and the various ways to assess them. 
Section 2.5 reviews all existing works relating to power systems vulnerability and 
cascading failures. Section 2.6 deals with fault location in power networks. It surveys the 
existing fault location technologies and describes in more details the methodologies 
relevant to this study. This section also reviews past researches conducted on fault 
location in transmission and distribution systems. Finally, Section 2.7 gives a brief 
description of softwares used in this research. 
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2.2 COMPLEX NETWORK THEORY 
The simplest and most direct definition of Complex Network Theory as given by 
National Research Council (NRC) is “organized knowledge of networks based on their 
study using scientific methods.”  However, each field of research using the network 
science has a different definition based on application. A network can be defined by its 
structure (connection of nodes and links) and behaviour which is a result of interaction 
between these nodes and links. We can say that networks are representation or models of 
real world systems and their behaviour but not the systems themselves. It can be 
summarized that Complex Network Theory is the study of structure and dynamical 
function of a collection of nodes and links that represent something real [1]. 
 The topology of a network can be easily modelled using the graph theory. 
Specifically, the network itself can be defined as a set, },,{ fLNG = , where N is the set 
of nodes, L is the set of links and NNf ×:  is a function mapping the structure of G. The 
mapping function contains enough information to draw the graph as a set of nodes 
connected to each other via edges. However, the set G is not enough to define dynamical 
behaviour of the system which is governed by a set of rules based on the system and 
application [1]. 
With new advances in CNT, most of the complex systems in the world can be 
modelled and described in the form of a complex network. Several network models have 
been proposed with the intention of studying the topological characteristics and 
behaviour of such complex systems. As shown in Figure 2.1, the types of networks can 
be broadly classified as regular, small world, random and scale-free [3][4][12][13][14]: 
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Figure 2.1 Types of Complex Networks 
 
Figure 2.2 shows a simple rewiring diagram which illustrates the relationship 
between regular, small world and random networks [15]. We start with a ring lattice with 
20=n  nodes and each of them connected to four of their neighbours. Let each edge be 
rewired randomly with a probability P i.e. P is the ratio of number of lines rewired 
randomly versus total number of lines. Then, for 0=P  the original lattice is unchanged.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Relationship between Network Models and Randomness 
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As the value of P is increased, the network becomes increasingly random and for 1=P , 
all the lines are rewired randomly. The small world phenomenon exists in the 
intermediate region 10 << P . 
 
Regular Networks 
Initially the complex networks were assumed to be completely regular. A few examples 
of regular networks are chains, grids, lattices, fully connected graphs etc. The relatively 
simple architecture allows us to focus on the complexity caused by the non-linear 
dynamics of nodes and edges without the additional complexity of the topology itself [7]. 
Hence, these network models have been used quite often to study dynamical systems 
such as disease spread, ecosystems etc. For a regular network the clustering is high as 
well as the average distance between nodes is high [16]. 
 
Random Networks 
The regular network models were not efficient enough to describe the phenomenon of 
real world systems, so Erdos and Renyi [17] came up with the idea of random networks. 
The term random refers to disordered arrangement nature of links connecting various 
nodes. Such networks are created when each pair of node is connected by a link with 
uniform probability. These networks were studied by Erdos and Renyi from a purely 
mathematical point of view. However, networks with complex topology and unknown 
properties are often represented as a random graph. Hence, the random-graph theory has 
a significant place in the study of complex networks. In case of random networks, the 
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average distance between nodes is small and the clustering is low [16]. Such networks are 
usually robust to targeted attacks but very vulnerable to random failures or attacks [18]. 
 
Small World Networks 
There are networks whose behaviour falls in between a regular network and a random 
network. These types of complex networks are classified as small world networks which 
were first introduced by Watts and Strogatz [15][16][19]. As shown in Figure 2.2, for 
0=P  the result is a regular network and for 1=P  the result is completely random but 
for a non-zero but low P, the result will be a small-world network with many local 
connections and few long-distance connections. Even though there are few long distance 
connections present in such networks, the shortest path length between any two nodes 
scales logarithmically or at a smaller rate with increasing network size. This means even 
in a small world network with many nodes, the shortest path length between two nodes is 
likely to be relatively small and the clustering will be high [13].  Power system is a good 
example of small world network. 
 
Scale Free Networks 
About the same time when Watts and Strogatz developed the small world model, 
Barabasi and Albert [13] came up with an alternate network model which grew by 
preferential attachment and were called scale free networks. These networks grow in 
such a way that nodes with higher degrees receive more new connections as compared to 
others with low degrees i.e. the probability of making a new connection to node i is 
proportional to its degree. Unlike the Gaussian distribution which has cut-off values 
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where the distribution goes to zero, scale-free distributions have no such cut-offs and 
instances of all scales are present and hence the term scale-free. These networks are 
simply the ones with power law degree distribution where most nodes have low 
connectivity but some of them are highly connected to the rest of the network [20]. This 
makes those highly connected nodes or hubs very vulnerable to attacks. Thus, such 
network models are robust to random attacks but can be highly vulnerable to targeted 
attacks [18]. A classic example of a scale free network is the Internet. 
 Figure 2.3 illustrates simple examples of regular, random, small world and scale 
free networks [21]. 
 
Figure 2.3 Examples of Complex Networks [21] 
 
2.2.1 Preliminaries [3][13] 
A network can be defined as a set of nodes or vertices with connections called links or 
edges. A vertex is the fundamental unit of a network, also called as site (in physics) node 
(in computer science) or actor (in sociology). They are connected together by lines called 
edges, also known as bond (in physics), link (in computer science) or a tie in (sociology). 
 The nodes or vertex represent various elements, tangible or otherwise from this 
world, like people, hardware devices, disease etc. and the edges represent the relationship 
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between these elements or the way they interact with each other. Figure 2.4 shows a 
network with nodes and edges in its simplest form. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Example of a Network with Nodes and Edges 
 
Networks can be of different types: For instance, there can be networks with 
similar nodes and edges or there can be networks with more than one type of nodes and 
different type of edges. Further, these vertices and edges can have a variety of properties 
associated with them. For example, the edges can have weights associated with them 
which might represent how strongly or loosely any two nodes are connected. Such 
networks are called weighted networks.  Any information is transferred within the 
network via the nodes using the connecting links. Sometimes, the flow of this 
information can only be in one direction in which case, the network is termed as directed 
graphs or digraphs. These directed networks can either be cyclic, meaning they contain a 
closed loop of edges or acyclic, meaning no such loops exists. Then, there are undirected 
networks in which flow of information can be in both directions of connections. Figure 
2.5 shows simple examples of various types of networks. Figure 2.5(a) shows a network 
with identical nodes and edges, Figure 2.5(b) has different types of vertices and 
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connections, Figure 2.5(c) represents a network in which nodes and edges have different 
weights associated with them and Figure 2.5(d) shows an example of a directed network. 
 
Figure 2.5 Examples of Various Types of Networks 
 
2.2.2 Survey of Measurements [3][4][14] 
Connectivity 
The connectivity of a network is defined by the number of edges connected to a node 
which is called degree. For a network with N nodes and E edges, the average degree K 
can be defined as: 
    
N
EK 2=       (2.1) 
The chances of a node having a particular degree is represented by a probability 
distribution, also know as degree distribution. As shown in Figure 2.6(a), node n is 
connected to four other nodes so it has a degree of 4. Similarly, as shown in Figure 
2.6(b), two nodes have a degree of 1, three nodes have a degree of 2, two nodes have a 
degree of 3 and one node has a degree of 4. 
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Figure 2.6 Example of Network Connectivity (a) Degree (b) Degree Distribution 
 
Another parameter to define the connectivity of a network is the clustering 
coefficient, which is the measure of average closeness of the nodes in a network. The 
clustering coefficient can be defined by the following equation: 
   ∑
∈
=
Gi
iCN
C 1       (2.2) 
where G is a network, i represents nodes belonging to network G, C is the clustering 
coefficient, N is the number of nodes in the network, and Ci is the ratio of actual number 
of links from node i to its neighbouring nodes to the maximum number of possible links 
from node i. 
Component is the part of the network which is connected. A vertex is said to 
belong to a component if all the other vertices can be reached by travelling along the 
edges. In case of a directed graph, a node has both an in-component and an out-
component, which are sets of vertices from which this node can be reached and the set of 
vertices which can be reached from this node respectively. 
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Distance Related Measurements 
Travelling along a network usually happens along an alternate set of nodes and edges 
which is called path. For an undirected and unweighted network, the number of edges in 
a path connecting any two vertices i and j is called the path length. In case of weighted 
graphs, the weights on the edges can be added appropriately to get the path lengths.  
There can be various paths between any two nodes but the most efficient way 
would be to travel along the shortest path which is termed as geodesic path. There may 
be more than one geodesic path between any two vertices. The length (in number of 
edges travelled) of the longest geodesic path between any two nodes of the network is 
termed as diameter. The average of the shortest path length between two nodes over the 
entire network is called the characteristic path length. It can be used as a measure of 
efficiency of the network and can be mathematically represented as [3]: 
    ∑
≠∈−
=
jiGji
ijdNN
L
,,
)1(
1
    (2.3) 
where G is a network, i, j represent nodes belonging to network G, L is the characteristic 
path length, N is the number of nodes in the network, and dij is the shortest path between 
node i and node  j. 
 
Centrality Measurements 
In Complex Network Theory, a vertex or edge is considered to be more important in the 
analysis if it participates in greater number of paths to transfer information through the 
network [14]. If the interaction within the network follows the shortest path between two 
vertices, then it is possible to quantify the importance of any vertex in terms of 
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betweenness centrality which can be defined as the fraction of shortest paths between pair 
of nodes which pass through any node or edge. It can be mathematically represented as: 
    ∑=
ji ij
ij
u
u
B
,
)(
σ
σ
     (2.4) 
Where ijσ  is the shortest path between vertices i and j and )(uijσ  is the number of those 
paths that pass through vertex or edge u. The sum is taken over all distinct pair of nodes i 
and j. 
In cases, where shortest path may not be known and instead a search algorithm is 
used for navigation, then betweenness of the edge or vertex can be defined by the 
probability of it being visited by the search algorithm. We can then calculate the 
betweenness centrality of the node or edge depending on the application. 
In case of unweighted networks, shortest path betweenness only takes into 
account the topological properties which may not be useful for many practical 
applications. Again in case of weighted graphs, it is not necessary that communication 
between two nodes happens via the shortest path so again this approach may not be 
useful in some applications. Hence, Freeman and Borgatti [22] proposed a centrality 
index based on network flow where the flow of information is considered through the 
entire network based on the application and the edges which carry maximum portion of it 
are identified as important. 
Contrary to the shortest path approach, Newman [23] proposed another measure 
based on random walks, counting how often a node or edge is traversed by a random 
walk between any two vertices. This approach includes contributions from essentially all 
paths between nodes, although it still gives more importance to short paths. Random 
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walks can be seen as a stochastic process on networks using matrix methods. The 
information moves along the network by hopping onto one of the adjacent nodes chosen 
uniformly at random from all the possibilities and so on. Thus, the centrality index based 
on random walks can be defined as the number or times a node or edges is used, averaged 
over a large number of trials of random walks. 
 
Search Algorithms [24] 
Search algorithms basically find an item with specified set of properties (depending on 
application) from a set of other items. In reference to networks, the search algorithms are 
usually utilized to find nodes or edges which satisfy certain criteria; for example, to find 
the set of nodes and edges from any source to destination such that the path length is 
shortest. The network search algorithms can broadly be classified as Breadth First Search 
and Depth First Search. There are other algorithms based on these such as Dijkstra’s 
algorithm, A* algorithm, Floyd-Warshall algorithm etc. 
 Breadth first search (BFS) is a search technique for networks or tree structures 
where all neighbouring nodes at the same level are searched before searching for their 
children or successor nodes at the next level and so on, until the destination is reached. 
Therefore, this version of search algorithm is called breadth first search and the resulting 
search tree is a breadth first search tree. The search algorithm selects the marked nodes 
in the first-in, first-out order.  
Depth first search (DFS) is a search technique which begins at the root node and 
explores as far as possible creating a path along the successor nodes one after the other 
until no further node is found. It then backs traces one node at a time to initiate a new 
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probe until it can mark no new node along that path and so on. This version of the search 
is called the depth first search and the resulting search tree is called depth first search 
tree or spanning tree of vertices reached during the search. The search algorithm selects 
the marked nodes in the last-in, first-out order. 
 
 
Figure 2.7 (a) Search Algorithms: Breadth First Search 
 
Figure 2.7 (b) Search Algorithms: Depth First Search 
 
Figure 2.7 (a) and (b) illustrate the process of breadth first and depth first search 
graphically. The shaded nodes show the sequence in which different levels or branches 
are traversed and numbers within the nodes show the order in which they are searched. 
 
2.3 POWER SYSTEM 
2.3.1 Preliminaries 
Figure 2.8 shows a simple model of power system which comprises of generators, loads, 
bus bars, transmission lines etc. Normally, there is a sending end which transmits power 
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and a receiving end which receives power. Both these ends have their respective voltage 
and current levels. The transmission line is made of resistance, capacitance and 
inductance which account for active as well as reactive power. 
 
Sending End
Load
Receiving End
Generator
To Other Buses
Bus 1 Bus 2
I, P
VR, θR
VS, θS
Y12
 
Figure 2.8 Simple Power System Model 
 
 In Figure 2.8, VS and VR are the sending and receiving end voltages respectively, 
θS and θR are the respective phase angles, I is the current, P is the power, Y12 is the 
admittance of the transmission line connecting bus 1 and bus 2. The active power 
transmitted along this system can be represented as [25]: 
BVVGVVP RSRSRSss )]sin([)]cos([ 2 θθθθ −−−−=  (2.5) 
Where G (conductance) is the real part and B (susceptance) is the imaginary part 
respectively of admittance Y. 
 As more and more nodes (generators, loads, bus bars etc.) are connected to the 
above systems, it starts to form a very complex network. However, the system still 
follows the basic Kirchhoff’s law. The best way to represent such a system is by node-
voltage method. If the voltages of the generators are given and impedances of all the 
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loads and transmission links are known then the current flowing through the network can 
be calculated using node-voltage analysis. This can be mathematically represented as 
follows [26]: 
BBB VYI =       (2.6) 
Where, BI   is the current vector,  BV  is the node voltage or bus voltage vector and BY   is 
a   nn ×  bus admittance matrix which represent the ease with which current flows along 
the connecting lines. The above equation can be rewritten as: 
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where I is the current, V is the voltage and Y is the admittance of the transmission line 
connecting any two nodes.  
  
2.3.2 Modelling Power System as a Network 
A power system can be considered to be a large complex network with nodes and edges. 
The generators, bus bars and loads can be identified as the nodes and the connecting 
transmission lines can be modelled as the edges or links.  
A power grid can be modelled using the CNT by the use of a connection matrix E 
= {eij}, also know as adjacency matrix. Suppose, G = (V, E) is a network with n nodes 
and k edges, then the elements eij of the adjacency matrix A define the connectivity of the 
network. If there is a connection between two nodes i and j then the value of eij will be 1 
and if there is no connection then the value of eij will be 0.  
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Figure 2.9 Sample Network 
Figure 2.9 shows a sample network with 5 nodes and 7 edges. It can be modelled 
using the principles defined above and mathematically represented as a matrix as shown 
below: 
















=
01110
10101
11011
10100
01100
E     (2.8) 
Furthermore, we can add weights to the connecting links which could be a 
measure of electrical or topological property depending on the application. In that case, 
the 1’s will be replaced by the respective weights of the links. This will be further 
illustrated through various applications in the following chapters. 
 
2.4 VULNERABILITY OF COMPLEX NETWORKS 
2.4.1 Vulnerability and Robustness 
Vulnerability can be defined as something which is exposed to the risk of being harmed 
or attacked and in turn having a large impact on the performance of the system. It is a 
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measure of performance degradation when a component fails or is attacked. Thus, a 
structure is considered to be more vulnerable if any small change in the system causes a 
large impact on the network. On the other hand, robustness can be treated as exact 
opposite to vulnerability. It refers to the capability of any system to withstand failures or 
attacks. It means that the system will retain its structure and functionality (or regain) after 
being exposed to disturbances. 
 In network structures, it is important to know which nodes or edges are crucial for 
the optimum functionality of the system. Some literatures relate the vulnerability or 
robustness of networks to their connectivity [27], i.e. hubs or nodes with higher degree or 
connectivity are seen critical. Centrality indexes (as defined earlier) are other ways to 
assess the vulnerability of a network. The failure of vertices or links with a higher 
centrality index causes a bigger impact on the efficiency and performance of the network. 
So, some references [28][29] relate vulnerability to the decrease in efficiency of the 
system when certain nodes or edges fail or are attacked. 
 A way to find the critical component of a network is by looking for the most 
vulnerable node or edge. If the performance of a network is associated with its global 
efficiency then the vulnerability of the system can be defined as the drop in performance 
when any node or edge is completely removed. It can be mathematically represented as 
[30]: 
    
J
JJV kk
−
=       (2.9) 
Where J is the global efficiency of the original network and Jk is the efficiency after the 
vertex or edge k is removed.  
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2.4.2 Methods to Assess Vulnerability of Nodes and Edges 
One way to assess the vulnerability of a network is by preferential removal of certain 
nodes or edges [29]. In order to do that, the nodes and edges need to be ranked based on 
some mathematical analysis. Usually, statistical measures such as degree or betweenness 
centrality are used to decide the criticality of a vertex or link [14]. Degree is the measure 
of number of vertices connected to any node, and the higher this number, the more 
important is that node. On the other hand, betweenness centrality (which can vary based 
on application as defined earlier) is the fraction of times any particular node or edge is 
used for the transfer of any information through the network. The node or edge with 
higher centrality index is ranked as more critical [3][4][14]. 
 In order to assess the importance of these network elements, they are removed in 
the descending order of their importance i.e. degree or centrality. The value of degree and 
centrality for nodes and edges can be calculated at the beginning of the analysis and then 
network efficiency can be calculated after every attack [30]. However, as more and more 
nodes and edges are removed, the network structure changes leading to different degree 
distributions and betweenness centralities. Hence, in another attack strategy the degree 
and centrality indexes can be recalculated after every attack. The network will behave 
differently under different attack strategies and it is found that preferential node or edge 
removal based on recalculated degree or betweenness centrality is often more harmful to 
the performance of the system suggesting that network structure and behaviour changes 
as important vertices or edges are removed [29]. 
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2.5 VULNERABILITY OF POWER NETWORKS 
Power system security has always been an important issue for power supply and any 
phenomena which can compromise operations needs to be carefully analyzed and 
evaluated in order to see the impact on the security and reliability of the network [31]. 
This calls for intensive research to come up with efficient techniques to monitor and 
diagnose such systems for any fault or failure [32][33]. For complex networks such as 
power systems, this could be a time consuming and computation-intensive task. 
However, like any other network, there are certain nodes and links in power systems 
which are critical due to their location, function or the load they carry and can make the 
system very vulnerable to attacks or failures. Their identification can reduce the effort 
and time for monitoring such systems. 
 
2.5.1 Cascading Failures in Power Networks 
Power systems are very complex, dynamic and non-linear in nature. Its continuous 
growth in size and complexity pose new challenges to engineers in the field of 
generation, transmission, distribution, utilization, power system planning and 
maintenance [34].  
 In simplest terms, cascading failure in any system can be defined as a failure in 
which fault in one element can trigger a failure of successive elements and eventually the 
whole network collapses. Theoretically, any change in any part of the network will have 
an impact on the whole system. For example, injection of extra power or faults in any 
section or component will affect the behaviour of the whole system. Under normal 
circumstances, the system is resilient to a failure which means that there will be power 
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shift to adjacent nodes and edges and the system will eventually reach a stable state. 
However, if these faults or failure occurs in a few of those critical locations or elements, 
it can trigger a cascade of failures leading to eventual blackout. For instance, if a line 
carrying a significant portion of power fails then it will cause a huge load shift to adjacent 
lines. This might cause a few of those adjacent lines to overload and fail and so there 
would be further load shift. This could cause further failure in the system and so on 
which will lead to a complete system collapse. 
 There has been some research in developing various techniques to analyze and 
understand such systems behaviours. Crucitti et al [35] have presented a simple model for 
cascading failures based on the dynamical redistribution of flow on the network. They 
have shown that the breakdown of even one node with significantly high load can 
seriously affect the efficiency of the system. Similarly, Motter and Lai [36] have 
demonstrated that intentional attacks on networks where loads can be redistributed 
among nodes can lead to cascade of overload failures, which can in turn cause the entire 
or substantial part of the system to collapse. Zongxiang et al [37] have shown that power 
systems are usually small-world and then used the collective dynamics of such network 
models to analyze cascading failures in bulk power grids. Another way to understand 
load redistribution on transmission lines is the sensitivity analysis which utilizes the 
concept of shifting factor (SF), power transfer distribution factor (PTDF) and line outage 
distribution factor (LODF) [38][39]. They help to predict the shifting of load to adjacent 
lines in case of a failure. 
 In addition to normal failures, network hacking and intentional attacks further 
threaten the security of the system. There are some critical links in every network which 
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can make the system very vulnerable to attacks. If a network hacker has the right 
knowledge then he can target the most vulnerable elements which will have a huge 
impact on the system and may lead to a cascading failure.  Hence it is important to do a 
vulnerability analysis to be able to identify those critical parts of the network and monitor 
them for improved security. 
Figure 2.10 shows the satellite image of the famous blackout of Northeastern 
United States in 2003 [40]. The image on left is before the blackout and the one on right 
is after the blackout where most part of the city is plunged in darkness. Table 2.1 lists 
some other notorious blackouts around the world [41]. 
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 2.10 Satellite Image of 2003 Blackout of Northeastern United States (a) Before 
Blackout (b) After Blackout 
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Table 2.1 Famous Blackouts 
Blackouts Millions Affected Location Day 
Java-Bali Blackout 100 Indonesia 18-08-2005 
Southern Brazil 
Blackout 
60 
Brazil, South and 
Southeastern 
11-03-1999 
Italy Blackout 55 Italy 28-09-2003 
Northeast Blackout 1 50 
North America, 
Northeastern 
14-08-2003 / 
15-08-2003 
Northeast Blackout 2 30 
North America, 
Northeastern 
09-11-1965 
 
2.5.2 Vulnerability Analysis of Power Networks 
CNT has been studied extensively in solving large-scale practical problems and the recent 
developments have given a new direction to power system research. Power systems are 
usually considered to be small-world networks [9][37][42] meaning they are highly 
clustered and have small path length between nodes even if the network size is very large. 
However, some other studies also classify them as scale-free [10][11]. In a scale-free 
network, most nodes have low connectivity but few of them are highly connected to the 
rest of the network [20]. This makes those highly connected nodes or hubs very 
vulnerable to attacks. Thus, although scale-free network models are robust to random 
attacks, they can be highly vulnerable to targeted attacks as opposed to random networks 
which are robust to targeted attacks but vulnerable to random attacks [18]. 
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 This new direction of research utilizing Complex Network Theory is to model, 
analyze and understand power system networks [9][37][43][44][45]. The structural 
vulnerability of the North American power grid was studied by Albert et al [46] and 
Chassin and Posse [47] after the August 2003 blackout. Similarly, the large-scale 
blackouts motivated Crucitti et al [48] to analyze the Italian power grid based on the 
model for cascading failures [35]. Casals et al [49] analyzed the topological structure of 
European power grid and its tolerance to failures and attacks. In another work, Casals and 
Sole [50] have presented the analysis of Europe’s electricity network failure events for 
seven year period. Sole et al [51] have also explored the fragility of the European power 
grid under intentional attacks, where selective nodes of the network were removed and 
the patterns were analyzed. Motter and Lai [36] have shown how redistribution of load on 
nodes due to failure of certain important nodes or links can cause a cascading failure. 
Pepyne [52] studied a relationship between topology and cascading line outages in power 
grids. Graph based models are becoming more and more popular to define and analyze 
structural vulnerability of power networks [53][54]. Basic concepts from Complex 
Network Theory such as betweenness and efficiency based on shortest path have also 
been used in the past to identify the critical lines in power networks [42][55]. 
 
2.6 FAULT LOCATION IN POWER NETWORKS 
The size of power system has grown immensely with increasing power demand which 
has resulted in a complex structure with large number of transmission lines. This 
increased size with variety of loads adds to the complexity of the network and poses new 
challenges in the maintenance of reliable power supply. These lines can experience faults 
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due to physical or electrical breakdowns which could cause interruption in supply of 
power. It is very important to fix these faults and restore power supply for improving the 
system reliability. Some of the temporary faults clear themselves and do not affect the 
power continuity permanently. However, other permanent faults may require them to be 
manually fixed and maintained. One of the ways to do this is by patrolling on foot, 
vehicle or helicopters. Troubled regions may not always be found by such routine patrol. 
Moreover, this process can be accelerated if such faulty lines could be identified and 
further the fault distance from any node could be calculated. There has been extensive 
research in the past to identify and locate faults in power lines and networks. References 
[56][57][58][59] give comprehensive reviews of the existing fault location techniques in 
power transmission and distribution networks. 
 Fault locator is a protection equipment which applies some fault location 
algorithm for calculating the distance to fault or estimating the faulted region [56]. Fault 
location techniques usually involve measurement and calculation of impedance, current, 
voltage and other fault transients and the changes are used along with other system 
parameters to predict the fault point.  
 
Figure 2.11 Fault Location Methodologies 
Literature Review 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 41 
 As shown is Figure 2.11 these fault location methods can be broadly classified 
into knowledge based, impedance and fundamental frequency component based and 
travelling waves and high frequency component based. 
 
2.6.1 Knowledge Based Methods 
The introduction of high speed computers and microprocessors has lead to improvements 
in power system fault location and protection schemes. The hardware can now 
communicate with other control devices, the measurements can be synchronized, input 
signals can be filtered more precisely and in shorter time, and so on. However, all the 
growth in technology would be meaningless, if the computing power cannot be harnessed 
and utilized properly.  
This led to development of algorithms and systems with intelligence and decision 
making capability. Knowledge based methods are based on artificial intelligence, 
statistical analysis, distributed devices and similar hybrid methods [58]. Recently, there 
has been a lot of research in fault location techniques both in transmission and 
distribution networks using knowledge based methods. Such techniques based on 
artificial intelligence can be broadly classified into expert systems, fuzzy logic theory, 
artificial neural networks, genetic algorithm etc. [60][61][62][63][64]. Some of the fault 
location methodologies based on such knowledge and learning are discussed in 
references [65][66][67].  
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2.6.2 Impedance and Fundamental Frequency Component 
Based Methods 
Impedance based techniques are a popular way of estimating the faults which makes use 
of the fundamental frequency of voltage and current at the line terminals together with 
other line parameters. It is mainly considered that the measure of impedance of the 
faulted line segment is an indicator of the fault distance [56]. The analysis requires the 
measurement of voltage and current at the substations, and fundamental component 
during pre-fault and fault conditions are used in these methods to estimate the apparent 
impedance from the measurement point. The apparent pre-fault and faulty impedances 
are recorded and the changes are used with other system parameters to calculate the 
distance of the fault. Mora-Florez et al [68] have compared various fault location 
methods based on impedances. Power system topology, line and load model and the 
necessity of any additional information differentiates one method from another. The 
estimated error is used as a performance index in the comparison. 
 Other fault location methodologies involve measurement and calculation of 
current, voltages and other fault transients. These methods can be either single-ended 
where measurements are taken only at one end of the faulty line or double-ended where 
these parameters are measured at both ends. A major advantage of single-ended methods 
is that implementation is simple and sophisticated communication techniques are not 
needed. However, the fault location is usually more accurate if more information is 
available. Hence, if the resources are available then double-ended measurement methods 
may be preferred. 
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 Mora et al [69] reviewed some of the most relevant methods for fault location in 
radial distribution systems using single-ended measurement of current and voltage. 
Further, they proposed a hybrid fault location algorithm by combining the algorithmic 
and knowledge based methods. This hybrid approach comprises the extraction of 
information of from recorded voltage and current signals before and during the fault. Han 
et al [70] proposed a fault location algorithm for radial distribution systems with single-
ended measurements using a sinusoidal steady state analysis method. One of the 
advantages of such approaches is that they do not require the line parameters which can 
change with loading and physical conditions. This makes them more accurate and robust. 
This has been demonstrated by Radojevic et al [71] where they use measurement of 
voltage and current synchronized at both ends of line terminals and fast communication 
channels between the two synchronized measurement units. Another algorithm proposed 
by Djuric et al [72] allows calculating the fault distance irrespective of the fault resistance 
and load. 
The techniques based on fundamental frequency of currents and voltages have 
various advantages and are simple to execute. Hence, they are most popular in real world 
applications. 
 
2.6.3 Travelling Waves and High Frequency Component Based 
Methods 
Another method which has been a subject of interest is based on travelling waves [73]-
[79]. The basic idea lies in the fact that when there is a fault in any transmission line it 
generates electromagnetic current and voltage transients which travel forward and 
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backwards along the line to all the terminals or nodes until a post-fault steady state is 
reached [56]. 
 A lattice diagram illustrating the travelling of waves due to fault transients is 
shown in Figure 2.12. Forward (ef) and reverse (er) current and voltage electromagnetic 
waves leave the fault point and travel towards the nodes. These nodes represent 
discontinuity or impedance change so part of the energy is reflected back and the 
remaining continues to travel towards other nodes of the network. kA and kB are reflection 
coefficients which are determined by the characteristic impedance ratios and represent 
wave amplitudes. Similarly, tA and tB represent the travel times from the fault point to the 
nodes A and B. Construction of lattice diagrams becomes difficult if attenuation and 
distortion of signals are taken into account, so time-frequency resolution of the transients 
can also be used to determine the travel time of these fault signals to the line terminals 
[56]. 
 
Figure 2.12 Travelling Voltage and Current Waves due to Fault 
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 The voltage and current at any point x obey a set of partial differential equations 
given by: 
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Where, L and C are the inductances and capacitances of the line per unit length and e and 
i are the electromagnetic voltage and current transients. The resistance is assumed to be 
negligible, so the solution to the above wave equations for a lossless line in terms of 
forward and backward travelling waves can be expressed as: 
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where ef and er are the forward and reverse electromagnetic transients respectively, Zc is 
the characteristic impedance of the transmission line and v is the velocity of propagation 
of wave which is close to the speed of light. They can be calculated in terms of line 
parameters as follows: 
    
C
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=    (2.12) 
These travelling waves are recorded at the terminals or nodes with Travelling Wave 
Recorders (TWR). Further, they can be processed, using signal processing techniques as 
described in Section 2.6.4, to get the time taken by them to travel to the nodes. 
Unlike the impedance based methods, travelling wave technique can be used to 
measure distance to faults in all kinds of power lines such as AC transmission lines, 
HVDC transmission lines, lines with cable sections and overhead lines, lines with T-
branches etc. They are based on high frequency signals where the fault location is 
provided by the arrival time of the transients at the line terminals [56].  
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Such fault location techniques can be broadly classified in to two types, namely, 
single-ended measurement and double-ended measurements. The important factor in this 
type of fault location are detection of transient current or voltage signals and signal 
processing using wavelet transform, correlation etc. to calculate the arrival time at the 
measurement points [76]-[79]. In case of double ended measurements, the faulty signals 
are recorded at the two ends of the transmission line and the arrival times help in 
calculating the fault distance. With the developments in the global positioning systems 
(GPS), it is easy to synchronize the recording devices at different nodes to accurately 
calculate these time stamps. In case of single ended method [75]-[77], fault distance is 
determined by analyzing the fault travelling waves recorded at one end of the line. Time 
difference between the initial detected fault surge and the corresponding reflected surge is 
used for such calculations. 
There are other techniques which require measurement of high frequency 
components of current and voltage generated by the faults and travelling to the line 
terminals. However, these methods are not very popular as they are complex and 
expensive and require specially tuned filters for measuring high frequency components 
[80]. 
 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Travelling Waves Method [56]: 
 The travelling wave method provides accurate fault location and the measurement 
is free from influences such as, fault resistance, insufficient accuracy of line 
parameters, uncertainty of zero-sequence impedance, load flow etc., which affect 
the accuracy of impedance based methods. 
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 The travelling wave method can be used to locate fault in all kinds of power lines 
including, AC transmission lines, HVDC lines, compensated lines, lines with T-
sections, lines with cable and overhead sections etc. 
 Travelling wave based techniques require a high sampling rate and the 
implementation is expensive compared to impedance based methods. 
 A very accurate time stamping device (GPS) is needed at the measurement ends 
which increase the cost of the system. 
 
2.6.4 Signal Processing for Fault Location 
The high frequency signals which are recorded are usually mingled with interference 
noise and it is very important to isolate these signals before they can be used for location 
of faults. This is the reason why a high sampling rate is required so that the desired 
information can be extracted using various available signal processing techniques. The 
various signal processing methods can be divided into categories depending on the way 
signals are represented and the analytical tools used [81]:  
 Time Domain Analysis 
 Frequency Domain Analysis 
 Time-Frequency Analysis 
 
Time Domain Analysis 
Time domain is a term used for signals being processed with respect to time or it allows 
us to see how a signal changes with time. In time domain analysis, the function or signal 
values are known for all real values of time in case of continuous scale or at various 
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separate instants in case of discrete time scale. This technique is used a lot in fault 
location schemes which involve signal processing because of its simplicity 
 Statistical analysis is a common and simple way for time-domain signal 
processing. It involves some common calculations of arithmetic mean, standard 
deviation, variance etc. Another important measurement in statistical analysis is auto-
correlation which provides a way to estimate the similarity between signals [82]. The 
correlation technique has been used successfully in analyzing travelling wave fault 
transients [82]-[84]. 
 Another popular time domain based method is differential equation based 
approach in which the first derivative of current and voltage signals are used to form 
filters to analyze the transient signals [81][85][86]. The disadvantage of this method is 
that small amount of noise can lead to huge variation in the derivative [87]. 
 
Frequency Domain Analysis 
Frequency domain is a term used for signals being processed with respect to frequency or 
it shows how much of the signal lies within each frequency band over a range of 
frequencies. 
 One of the most popular transformations that can be applied to travelling wave 
fault transients to extract frequency components is Fourier transform [81][87][88]. The 
information which is not obvious in time domain can be easily observed in the frequency 
domain. For any signal )(tf , the Fourier transform )(ωFT  can be defined as: 
    ∫
+∞
∞−
−
= dtetfFT tjωω )()(     (2.13) 
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Fourier transform analysis is global in time and is practically not suitable to analyze non-
stationary and fast-changing transient signals [81]. 
 
Time-Frequency Analysis 
Time-frequency based methods are used for characterizing and analyzing signals whose 
statistics changes with time. Transient signals are a good example where this technique 
can be used more effectively, as time domain or frequency domain methods are not very 
suitable due to chances of relatively large errors. 
 The problems mentioned for Fourier transform to analyze non-stationary signals 
is resolved by another method called short time Fourier transform where the signal )(tf  
is divided into segments limited by a window )(tw  within which it can be considered to 
be stationary [81]. Short time Fourier transform is defined as the Fourier transform of the 
function, )()( τ−twtf : 
    ∫
+∞
∞−
−
−= dtetwtftSTFT tjωτω )()(),(    (2.14) 
Where )(tf  is the function )( τ−tw  is a window function, t is time and τ is shifting. 
 The problem of non-stationary signal is taken care of by short time Fourier 
transform but at the cost of lower resolution of frequency. One can determine the time 
interval in which a certain band of frequencies exist but cannot detect a point of time 
where any spectral component exists [87]. 
 Another method similar to short time Fourier transform is the concept of wavelet 
transform. It is a new and powerful signal processing tool and most suited for travelling 
wave signals [81][89]. This method uses short time intervals for high frequency 
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components and longer time intervals for low frequency components which means the 
window of wavelet transform adjusts automatically based on the frequencies [87]. The 
main difference from the previous technique is the formulation of basis functions which 
are known as wavelets and defined as [81]: 
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Where *ψ  means complex conjugate, p is the scaling factor and τ  is shifting. 
 The wavelet is an oscillating waveform that persists for only one or few cycles 
and generally it is a complex valued function. These wavelets are then used as a kernel 
function in an integral transform similar to complex exponentials in Fourier transform 
[81]: 
    ∫
+∞
∞−





 −
= dt
p
t
tf
p
pCW f
τψτ *)(1),(   (2.16) 
The above equation is termed as continuous wavelet transform (CWT). It should 
be noted that in wavelet transforms, the analyzed signal may have a continuous or 
discrete form. When the functions are sampled waveforms in discrete time, the resulting 
transform is called discrete-time wavelet transform [81][87].  
 
2.6.5 Factors Affecting Fault Location Accuracy [56] 
There can be a number of factors affecting fault location methods. In general, few of the 
main factors affecting the measurement accuracy can be listed as below: 
 Inaccurate compensation for the reactance effect in the case of fault location 
methodology using single-ended measurement. 
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 Inaccurate line parameters which do not match the actual parameters. 
 Uncertainty about the line parameters, particularly for the zero-sequence 
impedance. 
 Inaccurate compensation for the mutual effects on the zero-sequence components. 
This takes place if the current required for compensating the mutual coupling is 
not available. 
 The accuracy of the line model is not sufficient. 
 Presence of shunt reactors and capacitors or series capacitor compensating 
devices. 
 The load flow is not balanced. 
 The sampling frequency and bit resolution of the analog to digital systems are not 
sufficient. 
In order to improve the fault location accuracy, it is important to reduce every possible 
error related to the considered methodology as much as possible. 
 
2.7 SOFTWARE 
MATLAB (which stands for MATrix LABoratory) is a very powerful tool which 
provides an environment to develop and run simulation programs. It has a dedicated 
SimPowerSystem toolbox in Simulink to model and simulate power systems [90][91]. 
Other than that it is a matrix based program which can handle large amount of data in 
matrix format which is ideal for network based study. It is easy to model and simulate 
network structures based on their adjacency matrices. Most of the network algorithms in 
this research have been developed and simulated in Matlab. 
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 Graphviz is an open source graph visualization project from AT&T Research [92] 
which can be used together with MATLAB for visualizing networks graphically. 
 Another powerful tool for analysis of transients and electromagnetic waves in 
power systems is Alternate Transients Program/Electromagnetic Transients Program 
(ATP/EMTP) [93][94]. It is very useful to model and simulate power generation and 
distribution systems. The software has a reputation for capability of good power system 
models and reliable results. However, it is not very user friendly and hence not very 
popular and suitable for commercial use. It is primarily designed for electromagnetic 
transient analysis and has other supporting programs which further support the analysis. 
Therefore, it can be used effectively to study fault location techniques. It has been used 
quite often to compare and validate field measurement results [95]. ATP/EMTP has been 
used to model and simulate fault location part of the research. 
 
2.8 SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented a thorough survey of literature in complex systems and power 
systems, particularly related to vulnerability assessment and fault location. It has 
discussed the application of Complex Network Theory in vulnerability analysis, 
including various preliminary concepts which have been used throughout this research. 
Further, various fault location methodologies and existing works have been covered. In 
particular, attention has been given to travelling wave based methodologies and signal 
processing techniques which have been used for fault location in this study. Overall, this 
chapter serves as a foundation for the rest of the thesis. 
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Chapter 3 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS: SHORTEST PATH 
BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY 
 
3.1 OVERVIEW 
This chapter discusses the vulnerability assessment of a power network using the 
betweenness centrality approach. Section 3.2 gives some preliminaries relevant to this 
study. Section 3.3 uses a simple example of the IEEE 39 bus system to demonstrate the 
topological vulnerability analysis using preferential node removal with degree 
distribution. Section 3.4 proposes the vulnerability analysis of power networks using the 
shortest path betweenness approach. This section explains the modelling of a power 
system so as to incorporate some of its electrical properties and also defines some of the 
network parameters and efficiency factors which are used in assessing the performance of 
the network. It also introduces the new betweenness index using the reactance of the 
transmission lines to weigh the connection matrix and measure the vulnerability of a 
power network. Finally, the proposed methodology is demonstrated by a rigorous 
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analysis on the IEEE 39 bus and IEEE 118 bus systems using the betweenness 
preferential edge removal. 
 
3.2 PRELIMINARIES [3] 
On the very basic level, a network which is also known as a graph in some studies 
consists of points termed as vertex or nodes which are connected to each other physically 
or by some relationship. These connections or relationships are termed as edges or links. 
A network can be something tangible or hypothetical. As long as we are able to define 
nodes in a system and a relationship between those nodes, we can form a network. 
 There are several parameters defined to measure the connectivity and intactness 
of a network. The basic connectivity of a network is defined by degree which is the 
number of edges or number of adjacent nodes connected to any node. Further, this 
information can be expanded over the network by degree distribution which gives the 
frequency of occurrence of each degree i.e. it represents the number of nodes in the 
network having a particular degree or in case of a growing network it is represented by a 
probability distribution and could be interpreted as chances of a node having a particular 
degree.     
The biggest connected part of any network is termed as giant component and if 
there are any nodes left out due to failure or other reasons, they are said to form islands. 
Other measure which defines the average closeness of a network is termed as clustering 
coefficient. It represents the ease with which nodes can be reached from each other or in 
other words information can be communicated between them. Any information is 
transmitted via alternate set of nodes and edges and the most efficient way to do this 
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would be in the shortest number of steps which is termed as geodesic path in the network 
theory. 
In this chapter, we will use all this information is identifying the critical 
components (nodes and edges) and assessing the performance of the network. 
 
3.2.1 Preferential Removal of Nodes and Edges 
In order to analyze the vulnerability of a network we need to attack it and assess its 
performance under various conditions. As discussed in detail in the previous chapter, one 
of the methods is by preferential removal of nodes or edges i.e. by removing the nodes or 
disconnecting the edges which have been identified as important in the analysis and 
checking for efficiency of the system after every step. In order to do this, we use two 
attack strategies as defined below [29]: 
Random Attacks - The network is subject to random attacks where the nodes or 
links are removed randomly. Certain number of nodes or links are removed one after the 
other and the efficiency of the network is calculated after every attack. It is expected that 
the system will be robust to such attacks. 
Targeted Attacks - The network is subject to targeted attacks which means the 
nodes or links with highest centrality indices are removed. Again, certain number of such 
nodes or links are removed one by one and the efficiency of the network is calculated 
after every attack. It will be demonstrated in this chapter that the system is very 
vulnerable to such attacks. 
 
 
Vulnerability Analysis: Shortest Path Betweenness Centrality 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 56 
3.3 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF NODES 
As discussed earlier, one of the ways to analyze the vulnerability of any network is to 
identify the critical elements and then assess the performance by preferential removal of 
those elements. One of the fundamental ways to do so is by centrality measure i.e. try and 
find the most important or central component (node of edge) of any network. Perhaps, the 
simplest measure of centrality is degree centrality in which any node is classified as 
important by the number of other adjacent nodes connected to them. It can be represented 
mathematically as [96]: 
    ∑
=
=
n
j
iji AK
1
      (3.1) 
Where Ki is the degree centrality of node i, and Aij defines nodes connected to node i. 
 
3.3.1 IEEE 39 Bus System 
 
Figure 3.1 IEEE 39 Bus System 
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Figure 3.1 shows the IEEE 39 bus system [97]. The horizontal bold bars represent the bus 
bars which are identified as the nodes of the system. The bus bars with circles are the 
generator nodes, the ones with arrows are load nodes and others are intermediate nodes. 
The transmission lines connecting different bus bars are identified as the edges. The IEEE 
39 bus system is modelled as described in Section 2.3.2 and a connection adjacency 
matrix is defined. We do not use any weights on the links for the analysis of vulnerable 
nodes. 
Further, the degree of each node is calculated using Equation (3.1). The degree 
distribution of the IEEE 39 bus system is plotted in Figure 3.2, and it can be seen that 
there are very few nodes which have a high connectivity. It is these highly connected 
nodes which are classified as vulnerable as their failure will affect all the adjacent nodes 
connected to them and hence will have a bigger impact on the performance of the system. 
 
Figure 3.2 Degree Distribution of IEEE 39 Bus System 
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Figure 3.3 Clustering of the IEEE 39 Bus System under Random and Targeted Attack 
 
In order to verify the results, the clustering coefficient, which is the measure of 
average closeness or connectivity of the network, is calculated by using Equation (2.2) 
from Chapter 2. As the nodes are removed the clustering of the network reduces 
accordingly. First we attack the system randomly in which random nodes with low degree 
are picked and removed. A total of five random nodes are removed and the clustering 
coefficient is calculated after every step. Next, the system is subject to targeted attack 
where nodes with high connectivity are picked and removed in order of their degree. The 
top five nodes identified as important are removed and the clustering coefficient is 
calculated accordingly. The results as shown in Figure 3.3, are plotted as a percentage of 
remaining cluster of the original network. We can see that the size of the cluster shrinks 
rapidly under targeted attack and reduces to around 56% after five attacks. Whereas, the 
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network is fairly robust to random attacks and the cluster size reduces to only 86% after 
five attacks.  
This test case is a small network with only 39 nodes and 46 connections. Further, 
removal of one node disconnects several links so the network size drops rapidly. Hence 
we have only considered disconnecting 5 nodes in each case to demonstrate the idea. As 
the network size increases with more and more nodes and edges, this difference in 
performance will be more prominent which will be dealt with in following sections. 
 
3.4 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS USING SHORTEST 
PATH BETWEENNESS APPROACH 
The analysis presented in Section 3.3 is purely topological and only considers the 
network structure. It is simple to execute but does not take into account any of the 
electrical properties of the power system under consideration. Further, it is very difficult 
to model the dynamics going on within the nodes of a power network. However, it is 
possible to take into account the static properties of the connecting transmission lines. 
Moreover, it is usually the transmission lines which are exposed to more risks than nodes 
as the generators, loads etc are usually well monitored. Hence, the rest of the 
vulnerability analysis in this thesis is carried out on the transmission lines where different 
methodologies are proposed to identify most vulnerable links.  
In order to feed electrical properties to our network model, we can assign weights 
to the connecting links. The weights in case of a power system could be parameters like 
impedance of a transmission line, power transmitted via a link etc. 
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The information being transmitted over a power system network is electrical 
power. The number of times a link is being used in order to transfer power in the network 
is termed as the line betweenness. If this highly used link is removed, the average path 
over the network could increase significantly leading to a drop in the efficiency of the 
system. Thus, this betweenness index could be used to identify the critical links of the 
network under consideration. 
 
3.4.1 Electrical Model of a Power Network 
The power flowing through any power network is dependent on the transmission line 
parameters and node voltages as discussed earlier in Section 2.3. For simplification 
purpose, we assume the line to be lossless, which means the resistance is considered to be 
negligible. The power flow will then be dependent on the node voltages and line 
reactance. In such a case, the active power transmitted from node i to node j of the power 
network can be represented as following [25]: 
    ij
ij
ji
x
vv
P αsin=      (3.2) 
where P  is the active power flowing through the line, vi, vj are the voltages, αij is the 
phase angle between the voltages, and xij is the reactance of the line.   
 We can see from Equation (3.2) that the power flowing through any transmission 
line from node i to node j is inversely proportional to the reactance of that line i.e. 
ijx
P 1∝ . In order to simplify the problem at hand, the phase angle and voltages of the 
nodes have not been taken into consideration. 
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The following derivation will serve as a supplement to the above simplification. 
According to Kirchhoff’s law, current or power follows the path of least resistance or 
alternatively, admittance is a measure of ease with which power flows through a 
transmission line [26]. 
Now,   
   
Z
ZY 11 == −  and jXRZ +=     (3.3) 
Where, Y is admittance, Z is impedance, R is resistance and X is reactance. 
Hence,  
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Now, 
   jBGY +=  so )Re(YG =  and )Im(YB =  (3.5) 
Hence, 
   
)(
1)(
22
22
XR
BGY
+
=+=     (3.6) 
 
Now if 
XR <<  then 
X
Y 1≈     (3.7) 
 We know that resistance in a transmission line is very small compared to its 
reactance value. Hence, we can make a safe assumption for the current study that power 
flow is generally inversely proportional to the reactance. 
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3.4.2 New Betweenness Index 
As shown in Section 3.4.1, we can say that the amount of power flowing through any line 
of the transmission network is inversely proportional to its reactance. Thus, we define the 
reactance of a connecting line as the weight in the connection adjacency matrix. 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Simplified Power System Network 
 
Figure 3.4 shows the equivalence of a lossless transmission line in which the 
resistance component is considered zero and only the reactance is taken into account. 
There are three bus bars or nodes and two transmission lines or edges. The reactances of 
the lines are x12 and x13 respectively. If 1312 xx <  then according to the assumption in 
previous section, there will be more power flowing from bus 1 to bus 2 than from bus 1 
to bus 3. Thus, if there is more than one path to follow from any particular node, more 
power will be transmitted along the less reactive link giving it a higher priority in the 
analysis. 
 The number of times a line is used to transmit power throughout the power system 
is dependent on its position in the network and the value of its weight which is reactance 
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in the current study. This number is used as the betweenness index to identify the 
vulnerable lines of the power network. The lines with high betweenness index are 
classified as critical in order of their values. Thus, the reactance of a line together with its 
position helps to identify the vulnerable lines. 
 
3.4.3 Shortest Path Algorithm 
In any network, there could be numerous paths along which information can be 
transmitted but the most efficient way would be to use the shortest path. For un-weighted 
networks, the shortest path is counted by the number of hops on the edges in reaching 
from the source to the destination node. In case of weighted network, the weights on the 
edges are added as we traverse along the network and the smallest sum decides the 
shortest path. Hence, the shortest path length dij between two nodes i and j can be defined 
as the smallest sum of distance among all the paths from node i to node j. There has been 
significant study in calculating the shortest paths in various networks and few of the of 
the popular ones are Dijkstra’s algorithm [98], A* algorithm [24], Floyd-Warshall 
algorithm [99] etc. 
We use Floyd-Warshall algorithm [99] in this study to find this shortest path 
length from any fixed vertex, say i to any other vertex, say j in the network. This 
algorithm finds the shortest path between all pair of vertices of any weighted graph in a 
single run. A power system is modelled and its connectivity is defined by a nn ×  
adjacency matrix E as described in, Section 2.3.2. At any instance, kth iteration uses the 
values from the matrix E(k-1) and stores the output in E(k). There are n iterations in the 
execution of the algorithm and the final results are stored in a nn ×  matrix E(n).   
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 Let E(0) = E and the (i, j) entries in the matrix E be denoted by eij. For any value 
of k, the matrix E(k) is obtained from E(k-1) by applying the following rules, known as 
the triangle (triple) operation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Floyd-Warshall Algorithm 
 
3.4.4 Line Betweenness 
Betweenness can be defined as the total number of shortest paths that pass through a 
particular node or edge [14][100]. In the current study, we are particularly interested in 
the betweenness of the transmission lines. In order to calculate the line betweenness, we 
use the following steps [101]: 
a) First, calculate the shortest path from a source node i to all other nodes.  
b) Then, starting from the node which is farthest we work towards the source node. 
In the process of travelling from the farthest node to source node we assign an 
index to each edge. This index is calculated as the sum of indices of all the edges 
leading to it (neighbouring edges sharing common node) plus 1. 
If, 
)1()1()1( −+−≤− kekeke ljilij  
Then, 
)1()( −= keke ijij  
Otherwise, 
)1()1()( −+−= kekeke ljilij  
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c) When all the nodes in the path have been covered, the index of each edge gives 
the betweenness count for the paths from node i. 
d) Repeat steps (a) to (c) with different source nodes until all the nodes are covered. 
e) The sum of indices for all possible iterations gives the complete betweenness 
count for shortest paths between each pair of nodes. 
Figure 3.6 Calculation of Line Betweenness 
 
3.4.5 Efficiency and Performance of a Power Network 
Until now, we have learned that shortest path is the most efficient way of communicating 
between nodes or transmitting any information through the network. In case of a power 
network this is the shortest electrical path after appropriate weights are put on the 
connecting links. As also mentioned in Chapter 2, shortest path can be used as a measure 
of efficiency for any network which can be defined as the inverse of characteristic path 
length i.e. average of shortest path over the whole network [16][35][43]. Consider a road 
traffic network as an example; if there is an accident which blocks the shortest route 
between two destinations then one is forced to take an alternate route which could be 
longer and more time consuming. In such cases, we can say that the performance of the 
road network has dropped. 
For a power network, this can be related to the links that facilitate more 
transmission of power, which in turn can be related to the shortest electrical path. For the 
current study, reactance has been assigned as the weight of the transmission lines and it is 
assumed that more power will flow through a less reactive path. Thus, the efficiency 
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between two nodes i and j can be defined as the inverse of the reactance of the connecting 
link: 
    
ij
ij
x
1
=ε       (3.8) 
This means that if two nodes are not connected, whether directly or indirectly, the 
distance between them will be infinite and hence the efficiency between them will be 
zero. The average efficiency of the whole network can be defined as [43]: 
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Where G is the network, J is the efficiency of the network, i, j represent nodes, N is the 
total number of nodes, εij is efficiency between node i and node j, and xij is the shortest 
electrical distance between node i and node j. 
 
3.4.6 Identification and Assessment of Vulnerable Lines 
The previous sub-sections discussed the various definitions and techniques needed to 
identify the vulnerable lines. Here we list the procedure of the identification process: 
a) Model the power system according to the principles mentioned in the previous 
sections and generate a connection adjacency matrix E. 
b) Add proper weights to the connecting transmission lines based on the line 
reactance. 
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c) Calculate the shortest electrical path matrix based on the adjacency matrix E with 
appropriate weights. 
d) Calculate the line betweenness based on the new betweenness index. 
e) Classify the lines with high betweenness index as the vulnerable in order of their 
magnitude. 
f) Attack the lines identified as vulnerable in order of their importance and calculate 
the efficiency of the network using Equation (3.10) after every attack. 
g)  Finally, subject the network to random attacks and compare the results with 
targeted attacks to verify the results.   
Figure 3.7 Identification of Vulnerable Lines 
 
3.5 CASE STUDIES 
This section describes the application of methodology explained in Section 3.4. The case 
of IEEE 39 bus system and IEEE 118 bus system are undertaken and the techniques 
defined in previous sections are used to identify the vulnerable lines. The results are 
verified by the proposed attack strategies and sensitivity analysis. 
 
3.5.1 IEEE 39 Bus System 
Figure 3.1 shows the IEEE 39 bus system and it is used again for assessment of 
vulnerability but this time using preferential removal of lines identified as critical. The 
reactance of the transmission line is assigned as the weight of the connection. This 
reactance is taken in per unit (p.u.) value. If there is no direct connection between two 
nodes then the weight is taken to be infinite. 
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 The methodology proposed in Section 3.4 is applied to the IEEE 39 bus system 
and the lines with high betweenness values are identified. Betweenness index is the 
number of times a line is being used based on its position in the network and the value of 
reactance. Table 3.1 lists the betweenness index of the top ten vulnerable lines.  
 
Table 3.1 Vulnerable Lines for IEEE 39 Bus System 
Line 
Number 
Betweenness 
Index 
Line 
Number 
Line 
Betweenness 
L15-16 203 L3-18 157 
L16-17 203 L17-18 155 
L14-15 193 L2-3 151 
L16-21 168 L2-25 145 
L13-14 166 L16-19 140 
 
Once the vulnerable links of the network have been identified, the system is 
attacked based on the proposed attack strategies and sensitivity of the network to these 
attacks is calculated. Firstly, the system is subject to random attacks and a total of 10 
random links are removed one after another. A total of 5 different set of such attacks are 
conducted and the mean and standard deviation is calculated. This ensures that results are 
consistent and valid for most random attacks. Next, the system is subject to targeted 
attack and a total of 10 links identified as vulnerable are removed in the order of their 
betweenness index. 
In order to do the sensitivity analysis, the efficiency of the network is calculated 
after each attack using Equation (3.10) and (2.9). The results are plotted in Figure 3.8 and 
it can be clearly seen that the system is robust to random attacks where even after 10 
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attacks the efficiency stays close to 90% with a standard deviation of less than 3%. 
However, when the links identified as critical are targeted, the efficiency drops sharply to 
almost 40%. The results will make more sense as the network size grows so next, we take 
the example of IEEE 118 bus system. 
 
Figure 3.8 Effect of Random and Targeted Attacks on the Efficiency of IEEE 39 
Bus System 
 
3.5.2 IEEE 118 Bus System 
Figure 3.9 shows the IEEE 118 bus system [102]. The 118 bus system is modelled based 
on the principles defined in earlier sections. A simulation is run and the vulnerable lines 
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are identified similar to the IEEE 39 bus system. The betweenness indexes of the top 10 
vulnerable lines are listed in Table 3.2.  
 
Figure 3.9 IEEE 118 Bus System 
Next, the IEEE 118 bus system is subject to attacks to verify the results. Firstly, 
10 random lines are selected and removed one at a time and the system is observed. 
Again a set of 5 different random attacks are conducted and the mean value and standard 
deviations are calculated. Then the system is subject to targeted attack where 10 links 
with high betweenness index are selected and cut one at a time. 
Again a sensitivity analysis similar to the IEEE 39 bus system is carried out on 
the IEEE 118 bus system and the results are plotted in Figure 3.10. It can be observed 
that the network efficiency is not affected much under random attacks. Even after 10 
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random attacks the efficiency drops by less than 3% with a standard deviation of less than 
1%.  
Table 3.2 Vulnerable Lines for IEEE 118 Bus System 
Line 
Number 
Betweenn
ess Index 
Line 
Number 
Betweenn
ess Index 
L65-68 3274 L8-30 1510 
L38-65 3145 L17-30 1354 
L30-38 2854 L65-66 1295 
L68-81 2796 L5-8 1243 
L80-81 2751 L49-66 1118 
 
 
Figure 3.10 Effect of Random and Targeted Attacks on the Efficiency of IEEE 118 Bus 
System 
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This time the size of the network is comparatively larger than 39 bus system so, 
there are more alternate paths for power flow. Hence, the effect of random attack on the 
performance of the system is even less. On the other hand, after 10 vulnerable links are 
removed, the network efficiency drops to almost 60%. 
 
3.5.3 Discussion 
It has been demonstrated that there are few links in every power network which can make 
it very vulnerable to attacks. It has been observed that the system is quite robust to 
random attacks and there is hardly any effect on the efficiency of the network if the lines 
are randomly selected and removed. This was verified by 5 different sets of random 
attacks in each case. Whereas, under targeted attack, where the lines with high 
betweenness index are removed, the efficiency of the network drops sharply to almost 
40% and 60% after 10 attacks in the IEEE 39 bus system and IEEE 118 bus system 
respectively. It can also be inferred from the simulation results that as the network size 
grows with more alternate nodes and links to transfer power, the system becomes more 
immune to random attacks. However, failure of vulnerable elements still has a significant 
effect on the overall system performance. 
 We are dealing with relatively small size of networks with 39 and 118 nodes. 
Hence, increasing the number of attacks to 20 or 30 starts to deteriorate the performance 
of the network even under random attacks. This is because there are not many 
connections and as we increase the number of attacks the chances of links with higher 
centrality index being removed increases. Further, in case of targeted attack, the drop in 
performance of network reduces as number of attacks is significantly increased. This is 
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because with increased number of attacks, the identified links become less and less 
important. This is more prominent in the case of IEEE 39 bus system which has only 46 
connections. Hence, we have considered only 10 attacks, which reflected good difference 
between random and targeted removals, throughout this study to validate our results. 
 Further analysis on the lines identified as critical will help to improve the results. 
A better power flow analysis with node voltages and resistance of the line might help 
produce better betweenness index. Overall, a more accurate study of this nature will 
further refine the results and point to the vulnerable nodes and transmission links.  
The shortest path betweenness approach is simple and efficient in identifying 
vulnerable connections in any network. However, it has certain limitations in case of 
power systems. Firstly, the power does not necessarily flow along the shortest path in a 
power system, but along all available lines from one node to another. Secondly, the 
power does not flow between all node combinations but only from generators to loads 
using the buses and transmission lines in between to connect them. These issues will be 
addressed in the next chapter where a new centrality index is proposed for vulnerability 
analysis of such systems. 
 
3.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented the structural vulnerability analysis of power systems. 
Initially, the IEEE 39 bus has been analyzed based on degree centrality of nodes. Further, 
few techniques have been described to model a power system as a network so as to 
incorporate the topological properties as well as some of the static electrical 
characteristics. Some basic definition, parameters and algorithms relevant to this study 
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have also been included in this chapter. Finally, a new betweenness index has been 
proposed based on the shortest path betweenness approach. The reactance of a 
transmission line has been used as an indicator of the ease with which power flows 
through it under lossless conditions. The new betweenness index identifies the vulnerable 
lines based on their position in the network and the power flow they carry. The results 
have been verified by calculating the sensitivity of the network to random and targeted 
attacks. 
Vulnerability Analysis: Maximum Flow Based Centrality 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 75 
 
 
Chapter 4 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS: MAXIMUM 
FLOW BASED CENTRALITY 
 
4.1 OVERVIEW 
This chapter overcomes several shortcomings of the approach discussed in Chapter 3 and 
proposes a new methodology for vulnerability analysis. Section 4.2 gives some 
preliminaries relevant to this study. Section 4.3 introduces a power system as a directed 
and capacitated network with a simple simulation example and explains the modelling 
technique. The electrical model of the power network is enhanced by using the bus 
admittance matrix to weight the connecting lines. Next in Section 4.4, a new centrality 
index is proposed based on the maximum flow algorithm in networks. Section 4.5 further 
illustrates the identification of important lines using simples test cases. Finally, the 
methodology is demonstrated and validated in Section 4.5 on the IEEE 39 and IEEE 118 
bus systems.  
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4.2 PRELIMINARIES [99] 
There are essentially two types of graphs or networks, directed or digraph and undirected. 
In a directed networks, there is information or data flow in only one direction of the 
connecting edge i.e. if Flowij = 1 then Flowji = 0. Figure 4.1 shows a simple example of a 
directed network. There is usually some information, data or energy being transmitted 
from one node to another through a network via the connecting links. The node which 
transmits the information is termed as the source, for which the in-degree is zero and the 
node which absorbs the information is termed as sink for which the out-degree is zero.  
 
Figure 4.1 Directed and Capacitated Network 
The intermediate nodes and connecting edges form the augmenting path and the 
inflow is always equal to the outflow from them. Such networks are usually directed 
which means if there is flow in one direction then there is no flow in the other direction. 
If the transmitting edges have a capacity or weight associated with them, they are called 
capacitated networks. A feasible flow in a capacitated network such that the value of 
flow is largest possible is called maximum flow. The value on edges of network in Figure 
4.1, show the capacity associated with them. Let a capacitated network be cut into two set 
of vertices, S and T, such that the source lies in S and the sink lies in T. Then, the set of 
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edges Eij (edge connecting node i and node j) such that Si ∈  and Tj ∈  is called a cut or 
source-sink cut. A cut is called a minimum cut if its capacity does not exceed the capacity 
of any other cut. 
 
4.3 MODELLING A POWER NETWORK 
This section gives an improved electrical model of a power network. The bus admittance 
is used to weight the connection adjacency matrix and is defined in such a way that it 
captures the real and reactive portions of the line which include resistance, inductance 
and capacitance [11]. Further, a power system is considered to be directed in any steady 
state for the analysis presented in this chapter. 
 
4.3.1 Electrical Model of a Power Network 
As discussed in Section 2.3, Power flows in a power network according to the 
Kirchhoff’s laws. Current or power usually follows the path of least resistance in a 
circuit. Alternatively, admittance is a measure which is directly proportional to power 
flow or decides the ease with which the current will flow through the circuit. Thus, the 
power flowing through a large power network can be described by the bus admittance 
matrix as shown in Equation (2.6) and Equation (2.7) in Chapter 2.  
The bus admittance matrix captures the resistance, inductance and capacitance of 
the connecting transmission lines as shown below: 
    )( ijijij jBGY +−=  for ji ≠    (4.1) 
      =∑
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+
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Further, using Equation (3.3) to (3.6) from Section 3.4.1, we can calculate the value of 
admittance as:       
)(
1)(
22
22
XR
BGY
+
=+=    (4.2) 
Where, Y is admittance, R is resistance and X is reactance. We will use these values of 
admittance in order to weight our network in the current study. 
 
4.3.2 Power System as a Directed Network 
A power system can be modelled as described in Section 2.3.2. However, any network 
modelled in this way would be symmetric (i.e. if there is a connection between node i and 
j, there is also a connection between node j and i) which indicates it would be an 
undirected graph. Chassin and Posse [47] discussed that in any steady state, a power 
system would be a directed network. This means that in a steady state, the direction of 
power flow in a power network can be measured and is fixed. Figure 4.2 shows a simple 
example of a power system modelled in PowerWorld Simulator Version 15. It can be 
clearly seen that in steady state, the power flow in network is directed. 
 
Figure 4.2 Power System as a Directed Network using PowerWorld 
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Hence, we will use a directed graph model of a power system which means the 
network is asymmetric and cannot have reciprocal elements. Thus, if there is a flow from 
node i to node j then there will be no flow from node j to i. Furthermore, we will put 
admittance, which are direct measures of power flow, as weights on the links. This means 
a link with higher value of admittance is capable of carrying more power between the 
nodes. Mathematically, if there is a direct flow from node i to node j then eij = Yij and the 
reciprocal eji = 0. 
 
4.4 CENTRALITY INDEX BASED ON MAXIMUM FLOW 
4.4.1 Maximum Flow 
Maximum flow problem can be defined for a directed and capacitated network and it is to 
find the feasible flow from source to sink without exceeding the capacity of any link such 
that the flow value is maximum. There has been significant study in finding maximum 
feasible flow through a network. Ford-Fulkerson [103] first proposed the maximum flow 
algorithm in 1956. Since then, there have been improvements; eg. Edmund-Karp 
algorithm [104], Goldberg algorithm [105], Ahuja and Orlin [106] etc. for faster and 
more efficient performance. 
We are looking for overall flow from source to sink through edges connecting 
them directly or indirectly. The restriction on the flow is that the in-degree of source is 
zero, out-degree of sink is zero and the inflow and outflow for any intermediate 
connecting node along the augmenting path is equal. The Ford-Fulkerson algorithm [103] 
is used in this study to find the maximum flow through this directed and capacitated 
network. This flow value is also equal to the sum of flows across the set of ‘minimum 
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cut’ edges according to the Max-Flow Min-Cut Theorem which is also known as Ford-
Fulkerson Theorem [99].  
Let G be a directed network as defined in Section 4.3.2 and P be a set of 
augmenting paths from source to sink. The weights on the network define the capacity cij 
of each edge and fij is the portion of flow through edge connecting node i and j. The 
algorithm can then be summed up as below: 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Maximum Flow Algorithm 
4.4.2 Centrality Index 
Based on the node-voltage analysis and Kirchhoff’s laws, we could say that amount of 
power flowing through any line of the transmission network is proportional to its 
admittance matrix. Thus, having admittance as the weight for the connecting transmission 
lines, we can define the centrality index based on [22]. 
Initially, label the flow of each edge in augmenting path set P as zero i.e.   
0=ijf  
For each augmenting path P from source to sink in G, let residual r be infinite  
∞=r  
For each edge i to j in P,   
))(,min(
ijfijcrr −=  
For each edge i to j in  P,   
rff ijij +=  
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 For any network G with m sources and n sinks, let fmax be the maximum flow from 
the source node u to the sink node v and let fij be the portion of flow passing through the 
edge Eij  (where ji ≠ ) of the network. Then the centrality index can be defined as: 
∑∑
= =
=
m
u
n
v
uv
ijij fC
1 1
     (4.3) 
Further, since we do not have a direct representation of power flow, we can normalize the 
above equation for relative values by dividing it by the total maximum flow i.e. 
∑∑
∑∑
= =
= =
=
m
u
n
v
uv
m
u
n
v
uv
ij
ij
f
f
C
1 1
max
1 1
     (4.4) 
Thus, the edges can be ranked with a centrality index based on the portion of flow they 
carry using Equation (4.4). The lines with a higher value of flow are given a higher 
ranking in this analysis. 
 
4.5 IDENTIFICATION OF IMPORTANT LINES 
4.5.1 Algorithm 
Section 4.4 discusses the various definitions and techniques needed to identify the 
important lines. Here, we list the procedure of the identification process: 
a) Model the power system according to the principles mentioned in the previous 
sections and generate a connection adjacency matrix E. 
b) Add proper weights to the connecting transmission lines based on the bus 
admittance matrix YB. 
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c) Calculate the maximum feasible flow fmax from the source to sink for each source-
sink combination. 
d) Calculate the sum of flow values fij through each edge for different source-sink 
combination to get the matrix Cij using Equation (4.3). 
e) Normalize the values, as shown in Equation (4.4), by dividing them by the total 
maximum flow through the network to get the centrality index matrix. 
f) Rank the lines with higher values of centrality index as important. 
Figure 4.4 Identification of Important Lines 
 
4.5.2 One Source – One Sink Example 
     
(a)       (b)      (c) 
Figure 4.5 Network Flow with One Source-One Sink (a) Original Network (b) Max Flow 
(c) Min-Cut 
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Figure 4.5(a) shows a seven node network with one source and one sink. The values on 
the edges are the link transfer capacities. Figure 4.5(b) shows the same network with the 
actual flow values on the edges in the case of maximum feasible flow from source to 
sink. It can be observed that, under normal operations, most of the links carry flow values 
below their capacities while there are few others which are working at their threshold 
values. The links working at their maximum flow values belong to the set of the minimum 
cut edges [99].  
This information about the minimum cut edges can be used in the design of the 
network to increase maximum flow or reduce cost for similar maximum flow output etc. 
In order to increase the maximum flow through the network, the capacity of the minimum 
cut edges should be increased as they are the bottlenecks. On the other hand, for same 
maximum flow output, the capacities of the links not being used to their limit can be 
reduced to cut cost.  
Figure 4.5(c) shows the effect of removing the minimum cut edges. In this 
example, the minimum cut edges are E4,6, E5,6, E5,7, E3,7. The nodes shown in different 
shade are the only nodes connected to the source if these minimum cut edges are 
removed and clearly the sink is disconnected from the source. It should also be noted that 
the maximum flow from the source to the sink is the sum of flow through these minimum 
cut edges which are being used to their maximum capacity. Hence, these minimum cut 
edges should also be given attention as they carry important information about the 
network. 
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4.5.3 Multiple Source – Multiple Sink Example 
Figure 4.6(a) shows a simple network with 10 nodes, two sources (node 1 and node 2) 
and three sinks (node 8, node 9 and node 10). The capacities of the connecting links are 
marked on the respective edges.  
    
(a)           (b)  
Figure 4.6 Network Flow with Multiple Source-Multiple Sink (a) Original Network (b) 
Normalized Max Flow 
 
 Table 4.1 explains the calculation of centrality index for any edge Eij for 
all source-sink combinations. The normalized flow values or centrality index for all the 
edges are marked in Figure 4.6(b). We can see that apart from the edges connected 
directly to the source, there are few links (whose values are circled) with high centrality 
index. 
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Table 4.1 Calculation of Centrality Index for Edge Eij 
Source-Sink 
Combination 
(u-v) 
Flow Through 
Edge Eij 
(fij) 
Maximum 
Flow 
(fmax) 
Node 1-Node 8 f1 f1max 
Node 1-Node 9 f2 f2max 
Node 1-Node 10 f3 f3max 
Node 2-Node 8 f4 f4max 
Node 2-Node 9 f5 f5max 
Node 2-Node 10 f6 f6max 
)( 654321 ffffffCij +++++=  
)(
)(
max6max5max4max3max2max1
654321
ffffff
ffffff
Cij
+++++
+++++
=  
 
 
These connecting links are ranked as important and critical in the analysis. If a 
link falls in the min-cut set and has a high centrality then it can be classified as very 
vulnerable. Hence, we can see the importance of this analysis as the network gets bigger 
and complicated with more sources, sinks and intermediate nodes and edges. 
 
4.6 CASE STUDIES 
This section presents the vulnerability assessment of the IEEE 39 bus and IEEE 118 bus 
systems respectively, by applying the principles described in earlier parts of this chapter. 
It will be shown that the failure of vulnerable elements not only seriously affects the flow 
capacity of the network but also causes heavy load shift to adjacent lines which can 
sometimes lead further failures and eventual cascades. 
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4.6.1 IEEE 39 Bus System 
Firstly, the IEEE 39 bus system [97] shown in Chapter 3, Figure 3.1, is modelled as 
explained in Section 4.3. The network is treated as a directed graph and directions are 
defined by flow analysis in any steady state. The connecting links are weighted based on 
the admittance matrix in such a way that they also maintain the direction of flow. The 
modelled network is asymmetric which means that, in a steady state, if there is a flow 
from node i to node j then there is no flow from node j to node i. Figure 4.7 shows the 
equivalent directed network of the IEEE 39 bus system with relevant weights on the 
connecting links generated by Matlab. 
 
Figure 4.7 IEEE 39 Bus System as a Directed Network 
 
 The idea proposed in this chapter is applied to the IEEE 39 bus system and the 
lines with high flow values are ranked and identified as important based on the portion of 
flow they carry. Figure 4.8 shows the network configuration with the normalized flow 
values of the connecting lines. 
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Figure 4.8 IEEE 39 Bus System with Normalized Max Flow 
 
Table 4.2 Centrality Index for IEEE 39 Bus System 
Line 
Number 
Centrality 
Index 
Line 
Number 
Centrality 
Index 
L35-22 0.2291 L21-16 0.1406 
L2-3 0.1889 L37-25 0.1341 
L22-21 0.1774 L19-16 0.1075 
L16-17 0.1508 L36-23 0.0940 
L33-19 0.1445 L23-24 0.0899 
 
 Table 4.2 lists the normalized flow values and ranks the top 10 important lines of 
the network. These values are further plotted in Figure 4.9. The x-axis represents the 
links connected to the 39 buses (nodes) and y-axis represents the relative normalized flow 
values on each line. It can be clearly seen that some of the lines carry significantly higher 
power than others. These are the lines we classify as important as they are responsible for 
more flow or functionality of the system. 
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Figure 4.9 Normalized Max Flow for Lines in IEEE 39 Bus System 
 
These results are different from the ones analyzed in the previous researches using 
the betweenness index with shortest electrical paths. This is because current analysis 
eliminates the assumption that power flows only along the shortest path and the searches 
are directional with power flowing from source to sink based on the capacities of 
intermediate connecting lines. However, some of the important lines identified are 
comparable to the other results which could mean they have a very important topological 
position in the network. 
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4.6.2 IEEE 118 Bus System 
Firstly, the IEEE 118 bus system [102] as shown in Chapter 3, Figure 3.7, is modelled 
similar to the IEEE 39 bus system as discussed in Section 4.6.1. Next, the methodology 
proposed is applied to identify the vulnerability of the IEEE 118 bus system. Since, this is 
a much larger network, so the relevance of this study will be clearer. The normalized 
flow values or centrality indices of the links of the analyzed network are plotted in Figure 
4.10. It can be observed that some of the lines carry significantly higher portion of flow 
than others. These transmission lines which carry higher flow values are ranked as critical 
in the order of their centrality indices. 
 
 
Figure 4.10 Normalized Max Flow for Lines in IEEE 118 Bus System 
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Table 4.3 Effect on Flow Capacity of Network after Random Attacks 
Attack 
Number 
Set 1 
(%) 
Set 2 
(%) 
Set 3 
(%) 
Set 4 
(%) 
Set 5 
(%) 
Mean 
(%) 
Standard 
Deviation 
1st 99.85 99.56 100.00 99.24 100.00 99.73 0.33 
2nd 99.66 98.96 99.32 98.89 99.21 99.21 0.31 
3rd 99.55 98.14 99.02 98.53 98.87 98.82 0.53 
4th 98.95 98.02 98.21 98.25 98.58 98.40 0.37 
5th 98.76 97.48 97.52 97.78 98.58 98.02 0.61 
6th 98.64 97.15 96.91 97.66 98.20 97.72 0.72 
7th 97.97 96.56 96.58 96.98 97.94 97.21 0.70 
8th 97.65 96.25 96.31 96.64 97.67 96.90 0.71 
9th 97.22 95.96 96.09 96.44 97.29 96.60 0.62 
10th 96.99 95.45 95.83 96.33 96.61 96.24 0.61 
 
 
Figure 4.11 Decrease in Max Flow Capacity of Network after Attacks 
 
In order to verify the results, this network is attacked and its robustness to failures 
is calculated in terms of remaining flow capacity. Firstly, the network is subjected to 
targeted attack, where the set of lines identified as vulnerable are disconnected one at a 
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time in the order of their ranking and the remaining flow capacity of the network is 
calculated after every attack. The results are plotted in Figure 4.11, and we can see that 
the flow capacity of the network after 10 such attacks drops to almost 70%. Next, the 
lines with low centrality indices are picked randomly and disconnected. The flow 
capacity of the network is calculated after every attack. The random attack is repeated 
with 5 different sets of lines and the results for 10 attacks are listed in Table 4.3. The 
mean values along with the standard deviations are plotted in Figure 4.11. It can be 
observed that the network is very robust to random attacks and even after 10 such 
failures, the flow capacity drops to about 96%. 
Further, the effect of failure of links on the load shift to adjacent connections is 
analyzed which explains the cascading failure to some extent. In order to do that, the 
centrality indices of the remaining lines of the network are re-calculated after 10 random 
and targeted attacks and the results are plotted in Figure 4.12 and 4.13 respectively. 
Figure 4.12(a) shows the original load distribution and Figure 4.12(b) shows the 
load re-distribution after 10 random attacks. It can be seen that the load profiles before 
and after the attack look similar which means there has not been significant load shift. 
The lines which had higher centrality indices before still hold their rankings. On the other 
hand, Figure 4.13 (a) and (b) show the load distribution before and after 10 targeted 
attacks, where the identified vulnerable lines are disconnected in the order of their 
ranking. It can be clearly observed from Figure 4.13(b), that many links which had low 
centrality indices originally have higher values after the attacks. This means there are 
significant load shifts between edges and in real working situation it may cause 
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overloading of these links, leading to further failures (if overloaded) and eventual 
cascades. 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 4.12 Effect of Random Attack on Load Distribution  
(a) Original Load Distribution (b) Load Re-distribution after 10 Random Attacks 
 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 4.13 Effect of Targeted Attack on Load Distribution  
(a) Original Load Distribution (b) Load Re-distribution after 10 Targeted Attacks 
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4.6.3 DISCUSSION 
The existing methodologies mostly use the shortest path betweenness approach to 
analyze such vulnerabilities of power systems and identify the critical lines. However, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, power does not necessarily flow along the shortest path in such 
networks and neither does it flow between each node. The approach proposed in this 
chapter takes into account these factors and hence, gives a better understanding of the 
loading of transmission lines based on their power transfer capacities and the network 
topology. Additionally, possible reasons for cascading phenomenon leading to major 
outages have been explained based on the load shifting due to failure of critical lines. 
 It has been shown that, like any other complex systems, there are a few links in 
power networks which are more vulnerable to attacks and need more attention than 
others. The failure of these vulnerable lines causes a significant decrease in the 
performance of the network. Furthermore, their failure causes a huge load shift to 
adjacent links which in turn might overload and fail, causing further load shift and 
reduction in performance. This phenomenon can lead to cascading failures causing 
serious power outages. Thus, identification of these vulnerable lines can improve system 
security and reliability by directing more resources on them. This shows the importance 
of identifying the vulnerable elements in any network and it is of more significance as the 
network size increases with more nodes and connections. 
 Since a power system is very dynamic in nature and extremely complicated, it is 
difficult to consider all the electrical and topological properties at the same time. 
However, this chapter gives a new way for identifying important links which will 
improve structural vulnerability analysis. Moreover, the proposed methodology can be 
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potentially used in any directed and capacitated network which involves flow of 
information, data, energy etc. between sources and sinks via intermediate nodes and 
connections. 
 
4.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter has proposed a new centrality index to rank important lines in a power 
network based on the maximum flow. Along with the physical connections and 
topological properties, the model incorporates some of the electrical characteristics of a 
power system by weighting the edges with admittance matrix based on Kirchhoff’s law. 
The admittance is a direct measure of flow of power so it accounts for the portion of flow 
through any line. The model has been considered to be directed in a steady state and then 
maximum flow is calculated from the source (generators) nodes to sink (loads) nodes. 
The flow values on each connecting link for all source-sink combination are added and 
normalized by the maximum flow through the network, giving a centrality index which 
can be used to rank their criticality. 
 It has been demonstrated using the case studies of the IEEE 39 bus and IEEE 118 
bus systems that power networks are robust to random attacks but the system 
performance drops significantly on the failure of critical components. Moreover, the 
cascading failure phenomena has also been explained using the case of load shifting to 
adjacent lines which could cause a series of failures due to overloading. 
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Chapter 5 
ASSESSMENT OF CASCADING FAILURE IN 
POWER NETWORKS 
 
5.1 OVERVIEW 
Until now, we have studied the vulnerability analysis of power systems. We have learned 
that failure of critical lines lead to significant loss in performance and huge load shifting 
to adjacent lines which could lead to a series of failures and eventual blackouts. This 
chapter investigates such cascading failures in more detail using power transfer factors in 
the case of outages. Section 5.2 explains the modelling of a power network specific to 
this study. Section 5.3 defines the distribution factors of a transmission line in case of 
outage. Section 5.4 introduces a few new definitions which will account for the group of 
lines that are affected in case of failures and so on. Further, this section gives an 
algorithm to identify the groups of lines affected and the order in which they might fail in 
case of certain outages and a methodology is proposed to assess such failures. As 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, efficiency of a network can be defined as the arithmetic 
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average of the inverse of the shortest length between nodes. This concept will be 
modified and used along with relative power affected due to failure of certain line, to 
assess the performance of the system after outages.  
The concepts of power transfer distribution factor (PTDF), shift factor (SF) and 
line outage distribution factor (LODF), introduced in Section 5.3, include the electrical 
interaction between components in power networks. They calculate the change of current 
or power in each line. However, they do not consider the topology and few other 
electrical features like maximum flow capacity of power lines. This study will take all of 
that into account to introduce a new concept of correlating lines in power networks. 
LODFs along with linear power flow model will be utilized to develop an algorithm to 
study the cascading failures in power networks. Finally in Section 5.5, the proposed 
methodology is demonstrated and validated on IEEE 14 bus system. The data related to 
load shift due to outages was available for this network and made other calculation 
feasible so it was chosen to demonstrate the current study. 
 
5.2 MODELLING A POWER NETWORK 
This chapter considers the topological properties of a power network along with power 
shift to understand and assess cascading failures. We still model the bus bars as vertices 
and the transmission lines as connecting edges. However, it is done in a slightly different 
way to what we have seen until now.  
The system considered in this analysis has N vertices, denoted by bus i ( i=1, 
2,…,N), and L edges, denoted by li ( i = 1, 2, …, L). The power flow on each line is 
designated by Pi ( i = 1, 2, …, L). A transaction ω  between bus i and bus j is an injection 
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of a certain amount of power in t∆  to bus i and withdrawing the same amount from bus j. 
The above transaction of power is denoted by ),,( tji ∆ω . 
 IEEE 14 bus system as shown in Figure 5.1 [107], is a typical power network 
which has 14 buses and 20 power lines. It includes all the major features of a power grid 
and its simplicity makes it easy to analyze it.  
 
Figure 5.1 IEEE 14 Bus System [107] 
 
5.2.1 Flow Capacities of Transmission Lines 
In the current study, we consider maximum power flow restrictions which means lines 
will fail when the power flow exceeds a certain limit. If the maximum power flow for 
line li is iP , we define a factor r to take into account the capacity of the power flow 
through each line as: 
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i
i ==      (5.1) 
where Pi is the actual power flow and iP  is the maximum permissible flow. 
We consider that line li is overloaded and disconnects instantly if 1>ir  or any other 
defined value. This set of outaged lines are denoted by OC. Furthermore, we assume that 
islands will not appear when cascading outages happen so that the total supply and 
demand for power does not change. Considering the power flow limit on each line, we 
want to evaluate the severity of cascading failure. The major concerns are listed below: 
 If a given line is overloaded and disconnected, which other line will fail after it, 
and furthermore, the next one after these two, and so on.  
 Which is the most vulnerable line. 
 Since the failure of one line will affect others so how to rate the most critical line, 
failure of which will affect maximum lines or flow capacity.  
 How to define an index to reflect the overall robustness of the power network. 
 
5.3 DISTRIBUTION FACTORS [108] 
5.3.1 Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) 
The power transfer distribution factor (PTDFs) measures the response or change in 
loading of power system due to change in power transfer from one area to another. In 
other words, they are the sensitivity of the power flow on transmission lines, to the 
additional power injected into a certain bus and withdrawn at the other bus. PTDFs are 
most useful for estimating the flows that result from a particular transfer and it helps to 
identify the flowgates which are most affected by such transfers. Flowgates are the 
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transmission facilities which can be transformers, transmission lines etc. For a power 
transaction ),,( tji ∆ω  as defined in Section 5.2, the PTDF for line lk is defined by: 
    
t
Pk
lk ∆
∆
=
ωϕ       (5.2) 
where kP∆  is the power flow change due to transaction ω .  
 
5.3.2 Shift Factor (SF) 
Shift Factor or SFs, commonly referred to as Generator Shift Factor (GSF) or Adjustment 
Factor represents the change in flow on a particular flowgate due to incremental change 
at a generator bus. Shift Factors are meaningful only when considered in source-sink 
pairs, since power injected at one bus must be removed at another location. They help in 
identifying the generator pairs which can influence a particular flowgate. SFs are closely 
related to PTDFs and when the transaction ω  is injected in bus i then the sensitivity of 
change in line lk is denoted by ilkψ and is called SF. For a linear approximation of the 
power system, PTDFs and SFs have the relation below [39]: 
j
l
i
ll kkk
ψψϕ ω −=      (5.3) 
where  ωϕ
kl
 is the PTDF for transaction ω  between bus i and j, ilkψ and 
j
lk
ψ are SF for 
power injected on bus i and bus j respectively. 
 
5.3.3 Line Outage Distribution Factor (LODF) 
Line Outage Distribution Factor (LODF) describes the impact of line failures on the 
flowgates. If contingencies such as line outages are considered, then LODFs represent the 
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percent of flow on a contingent facility that will be transferred on other monitored 
elements in case the contingent facility fails. Contingencies refer to possible failure of 
transmission lines. There are two types of LODFs, one is single line outage distribution 
factor and the other one is multiple line outage distribution factor. For a single line case, 
when the line lm fails, the LODF as defined in [35] is given by: 
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∆    (5.4) 
where, ),,()( tjil mmm ∆= ωω with im and jm being the terminal nodes of the line lm, kP∆  
is change of power flow in line lk, Pm is power flow in outaged line lm, )( m
k
l
l
ωϕ  is PTDF of 
line lk with lm outaged and )( m
k
l
lζ  denotes the LODF of line lk with line lm outaged. Thus, 
we get the following relation [39]: 
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In case of multiple line outages, we can use the DC power flow model to compute the 
LODFs [109]: 
10
,
0
,,
)1( −−= OOOMOM PTDFPTDFLODF   (5.6) 
where subscript M denotes monitored lines, subscript O denotes outaged lines and 
superscript 0 represents the initial condition. Hence, OMLODF ,  is the line outage 
distribution factor matrix for set of monitored lines M due to outaged lines O, 0
,OMPTDF  
and 0
,OOPTDF  are power transfer distribution factor matrices for monitored lines and 
outaged lines respectively. The linear power flow before and after lines outage are related 
to each other by: 
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where superscript 0 refers to initial condition, superscript C refers to contingency (or 
prediction for failures) condition, subscript M refer to monitored lines and subscript O 
refer to outaged lines. 
 
5.4 DEFINITIONS AND ALGORITHM 
This section gives a series of explanations about the correlation of lines in detail to assess 
the cascading failures and identify the line affected by such failures. Basically, some of 
the lines in a power network will be identified as critical in a certain sense and explained. 
After the definitions are explained, an algorithm will be developed to identify such 
affected lines of the power network under study. 
 
5.4.1 Definitions 
This section introduces a set of definitions which will help to classify the various lines 
according to their level of importance. They are classified in groups which relate them in 
the order they fail or as set of lines which are affected by certain failures. It also defines a 
robustness index to measure the performance effect of such failures on the system. 
 
Correlated Lines Set (CLS) 
For a given power network with N nodes and L lines, the ordered line set 
},...,,{
21 ciii lllC =  is called the correlated line set (CLS) with degree )( Lcc ≤ if the 
failure of lines in set jiO does not lead to islands and 
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where )1}(,...,,{
21
cjlllO jj iiii ≤≤=  is the set of outaged lines and subset of C. 
Moreover, 
)( jiO
kr  is the ratio, as defined by Equation (5.1), after the lines in jiO  are 
disconnected. Hence, the correlated set of lines with degree c, refer to the set of lines 
which will be affected by one another and could cause cascading failure in the power 
network. According to the description, 
1+jil  will be the next line which is most likely to 
fail following the lines },...,,{
21 jiii lll , considering their capacity to transfer power. The 
CLS relates the transmission lines of the network to each other and explains the possible 
cause of blackout.  
For example, given the IEEE 14 bus system, if line 1 (the line connecting bus 1 
and bus 2) fails, then all the power generated by the generator connected to bus 1 has to 
be delivered to the network through line 2 (the line connecting bus 1 and bus 5). This will 
immensely increase the load on it so it may fail after the failure of line 1. Later on, the 
computation results will illustrate this point. For each line li, there will be a set of lines 
correlated to it with certain degree and further, some of these sets are of more importance 
than others. 
 
Complete Correlated Line Set (CCLS) 
Again, for a given power network with N nodes and L lines, the set of lines 
},...,,{
21 ciii lllC =  is called the complete correlated line set (CCLS) of 1il , if it is CLS 
and the outage of lines in C leads to islands, or 
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Where )(Ckr  is the ratio, as defined by Equation (5.1), after lines in set C are 
disconnected. The complete correlated line set of a line li is actually the set with 
maximum degree. In the case when there is a formation of islands, the balance of the 
power supply and loads will change. Further line outages may still happen but it is 
uncertain and difficult to predict. Further study is required to know the complete 
cascading process. In other cases, when there is no formation of islands, there is more 
certainty and it is possible to predict the sequence in which the other lines will fail due to 
cascading. Therefore, the impact of failure of line li on the rest of the power network is 
predictable. For each line, there is one CCLS which gives information about the lines 
being affected by the failure of that individual line and the total impact on the network. 
 Further, the CCLS 
0iC  for 0il  is maximum if 0iC  has the most number of lines as 
compared to other CCLSs. The maximum CCLS of the given power networks may still 
not be of importance in terms of the power that it carries, because the power flow of each 
line in the CCLS may be small. So a weight metric for CCLS is defined to solve this 
problem. For },...,,{
21 ciii lllC = , its weight is the sum of the absolute values of power 
flows on each line in it. This gives: 
∑
∈
=
Cl
lC PW ||       (5.10) 
where WC is the weight index, Pl is the power flow in the lines belonging to set C. We 
can then term the CCLS 
0iC  for 0il as dominant if it has a greater weight as compared to 
other CCLSs.  
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The maximum CCLS and the dominant CCLS give two different assessments on 
the influence of failure of a certain line on other lines. The maximum CCLS describes the 
``depth" of the cascading failure which may develop. The dominant CCLS gives the 
overall power flow that the failure of a line can affect. Therefore, dominant CCLS may 
be considered to be of more significance, since it reflects the magnitude of fluctuation of 
power flow caused by that group of failures. In other words, they identify the set of lines 
which carry the maximum power flow in the network. The line 
0il  corresponding to 
dominant CCLS is considered to be more vulnerable and should be given extra attention.  
 
Fragility and Robustness Index 
Correlations of lines have been introduced in Section 5.4.1.1 and Section 5.4.1.2. These 
concepts point out the critical lines and their effect on the cascading failures. This section 
defines additional measure for assessing the criticality of a connecting line. The measure 
allows us to rate a certain line as more important than others. It also introduces an index 
to measure the efficiency or performance of whole network under failure of different 
lines.  
For a given power network with N nodes and L lines, let CCLSs be Ci ( i = 1, 
2,…, L). We say a line li has degree mi if there are mi CCLSs that contain li. A line is 
considered to be important or fragile for a higher value of degree. These critical lines are 
the ones which are most likely to be affected by other lines and hence need to be 
monitored. 
 The lines identified as vulnerable have impact on the overall performance of the 
power network. Based on above concepts, an index is proposed to measure the overall 
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robustness of such systems. For a given system with N nodes and L lines, if the pair of 
CCLSs are ))(,...,2,1}(,{ 0021 LLLillC iii ≤== , then the index to measure the robustness 
of the power network is defined as: 
∑=
i i
il
l P
P
L
r
i
i ||
||||1
2
11
2
)(
0
ζ     (5.11) 
where )( 1
2
i
i
l
lζ  is the LODF for 2il   when 1il  fails, 1iP  is the power flow on line 1il  and 2iP  
is the power flow on line 
2il .  The multiplication of 
)( 1
2
i
i
l
lζ  with  1iP  gives the power shift 
in line 
2il  due to failure of line 1il  and further division by 2iP  gives the fraction of power 
change. Hence, any given power system is robust when the value of r is small. Larger 
values of )( i
ik
l
lζ  imply that the impact of failure of line li on the power flow of line ikl  will 
be greater.  
 
5.4.2 Algorithm for Assessing Cascading Failures 
Power system is a complex nonlinear and dynamic system and hence, it is important to 
design a methodology which does not need too much resource and computation power. 
This subsection gives an algorithm based on the DC power flow model to compute the 
indices defined in Section 5.3.3. Since the DC power flow model is sensitive to the 
working point, we assume there are no island formations during the computation. In 
reference [109], the method to compute the LODF has been extended to multiple line 
outage case, which is given by Equation (5.5). This will be used to compute the CLS and 
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CCLS. To compute the CLS and CCLS, an algorithm as shown in Figure 5.2 is derived 
based on following steps: 
 Initialize all the parameters and suppose one line is disconnected. 
 Compute new power flow on each line, determine which line is overloaded and 
suppose it is disconnected, update the set of disconnected lines.  
 Repeat the above step. 
Ci derived from the algorithm are the CCLSs. Moreover, CLS with degree m (m<L), 
are the subsets of CCLSs. It is easy to count the degree of each line and identify their 
fragility based on the maximum CCLS. Once we have all the CCLSs, the corresponding 
weights can be computed and the one with maximum value can be identified. In the 
computation of the algorithm, LODFs )( 1
2
i
i
l
lζ  given in Equation (5.11) can be derived 
which in turn gives the robustness of the power network. In the algorithm, we detect the 
singularity of matrix )(
, ii CCPTDFI − . It is well known that when this matrix is singular, 
islands will be formed [110]. 
 The algorithm developed in this section gives a solution to the problems identified 
in this study. Since the linear model used is an approximation, the results derived from 
the algorithm are also approximate. Therefore, it is important to note that this solution has 
a certain degree of deviation from the real solution. However, it will be demonstrated by 
a case study using the IEEE 14 bus system in the next section that this algorithm gives a 
reasonable solution. 
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Step 1: 
Initialize and set the initial power flow on each line 0iP  and the maximum power flow 
iP . Set L and compute PTDFs ),...,2,1,()( Ljkkj
l
l =
ωϕ . Let 1=i , 1=k and set ii ll k =  as 
the first line in Ci. 
Step2: 
Analyze the Eigen values of )( 0
, ii CC
PTDFI − . If there is a zero Eigen value then stop. If 
not then go to step 3. 
Step 3: 
Use the equations below to compute the LODFs and iCiP , the power flow on each line 
after the lines in 
ilC  outage. 




+=
−−=
0
,
0
0
,
0
,,
.
1)(
ii
iiii
CCMM
C
M
CCCMCM
PLODFPP
PTDFIPTDFLODF
 
Then compute )( lijj Clr ∉  and determine 1+Kil .  
1+
∪=
Kiii lCC  and 1+= kk .  
Update 
iCMLODF , and 
0
, ii CC
PTDF .  
If 1}{max
,
≤∉ jClj rilj , then goto step 4, else goto step 2. 
Step 4:  
1+= ii ; If Li >  then stop, else got step 2. 
Figure 5.2 Algorithm for Assessing Cascading Failures 
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5.5 CASE STUDY 
We use the IEEE 14 bus system, which is redrawn in Figure 5.3 with all the bus bars and 
lines marked according to the modelling technique described in Section 5.2, to test and 
verify the proposed algorithm. The relevant data for IEEE 14 bus can be found in 
reference [111].  
 
Figure 5.3 Line Diagram of IEEE 14 Bus System 
 
5.5.1 Case I 
In case I, we set )20,...,2,1(8.0 == iri , as defined in Equation (5.1), and run the 
simulation. Computation results for the measurement indices defined earlier are listed in 
Table 5.1. The CCLS for l1 is },{ 211 llC = , which means that if l1 fails, the next line to fail 
will be l2. Moreover, the algorithm identifies that the outages of l1 and l2 lead to the 
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formation of island. From the data shown in Table 5.1 and the configuration of IEEE 14 
bus in Figure 5.1, we can see that lines l1 and l2 are the only two connections between one 
generator to the network and l1 carries much more power then l2. Once line l1 fails, the 
power from the generator will flow through l2 to supply the demand of the loads. This 
causes overloading of line l2 and it fails too. Once both the links l1 and l2 fail, the 
generator unit is isolated from the network and hence an island if formed. 
Another interesting fact is that CCLS of l2 is },,{ 5422 lllC = , which is different from 
CCLS of l1. This is because even after power flow on l2 shifts onto l1 due to failure of l2, 
line l1 still has the extra capacity to carry the load. However, line l4 and line l5 do not 
have enough capacity to carry the extra power which causes them to overload and 
eventually fail. In this case, islands will not appear. This means that when l2, l4 and l5 fail 
one after another, the other transmission lines continue to supply power to the rest of the 
network. This observation also suggests that there is a sequence in which the lines 
overload and fail.  
The weight of each CCLS is also shown in Table 5.1. We can see that C1 has the 
maximum weight which suggests that line l1 is the most important line in the network 
under study. Hence, if it fails it could lead to serious breakdown of the system. In terms 
of fragility index, line l18 has the maximum degree of 8, which suggests that there are 
eight CCLS (or instances) in which this line is affected and hence, it is considered to be 
critical. Again, the CCLS of line l8 is maximum and has five elements in it which 
suggests that its outage could lead to the failure of four other lines. Thus, we can safely 
say that lines l1, l8 and l18 are more important as compared to other lines of the network. 
Finally, the metric of robustness of the power network is calculated as r = 31.8858. 
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Table 5.1 Case I: Correlation of Lines (ri = 0.8 ( i = 1, 2, …, 20)) 
Line li 
Connection 
(Bus i, Bus j) 
Degree 
of li 
CCLS Ci Weight of Ci Power Flow Pi 
l1 (1,2) 1 {l1, l2} 219.0000 147.8806 
l2 (1,5) 3 {l2, l5, l4} 167.2498 71.1194 
l3 (2,3) 2 {l3, l6} 94.2000 70.0502 
l4 (2,4) 4 {l4, l7, l18, l20} 125.3498 55.2264 
l5 (2,5) 2 {l5, l4, l2} 167.2498 40.9040 
l6 (3,4) 2 {l6, l3} 94.2000 -24.1498 
l7 (4,5) 2 {l7, l18, l20, l4} 125.3498 -62.3398 
l8 (4,7) 1 {l8, l18, l20, l9, l19} 54.8451 28.9851 
l9 (4,9) 3 {l9, l18, l20, l15} 53.4000 16.6313 
l10 (5,6) 1 {l10} 42.0836 42.0836 
l11 (6,11) 1 {l11, l16} 12.5000 6.3048 
l12 (6,12) 1 {l12} 7.5451 7.5451 
l13 (6,13) 1 {l13, l19, l18, l17} 31.2048 17.0337 
l14 (7,8) 1 {l14} 0 0 
l15 (7,9) 1 {l15, l18, l20, l9} 53.4000 28.9851 
l16 (9,10) 2 {l16, l18} 9.0000 6.1952 
l17 (9,14) 2 {l17, l20} 14.9000 9.9212 
l18 (10,11) 8 {l18, l16} 9.0000 -2.8048 
l19 (12,13) 2 {l19} 1.4451 1.4451 
l20 (13,14) 6 {l20, l18, l17} 17.7048 4.9788 
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5.5.2 Case II 
In case II, we set )20,...,2,1(5.0 == iri , as defined in Equation (5.1), and the simulation 
results are shown in Table 5.2. A decrease of the coefficients ri (as compared to case I) 
means that the capacity of lines have been increased. As expected, with different flow 
capacity the lines will be correlated to each other in a different way which is reflected by 
the change in values of CCLS and other parameters. From Table 5.2, we can see that 
most CCLSs have a smaller number of elements and hence less number of lines are 
affected by failures. In this case, the metric of robustness is computed as r = 28.4369 
which is lower than the value in Case I. As discussed earlier, a smaller index implies that 
the system is robust and more reliable.  
 However, as can be observed in Table 5.2, C1 still has the maximum weight, line 
l18 has the highest fragility index and line l8 has the maximum number of lines linked to 
its failure. This is similar to Case I and hence, we can conclude from the analysis that 
lines l1, l8 and l18 are critical and need more attention and resources to enhance the 
reliability of the network. 
 
Table 5.2 Case II: Correlation of Lines (ri = 0.5 ( i = 1, 2, …, 20)) 
Line li 
Connection 
(Bus i, Bus j) 
Degree of li CCLS Ci Weight of Ci 
l1 (1,2) 1 {l1, l2} 219.0000 
l2 (1,5) 2 {l2} 71.1194 
l3 (2,3) 1 {l3, l6} 94.2000 
Assessment of Cascading Failure in Power Networks 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 112 
l4 (2,4) 1 {l4} 55.2264 
l5 (2,5) 1 {l5} 40.9040 
l6 (3,4) 2 {l6} 24.1498 
l7 (4,5) 1 {l7, l18, l20} 70.1234 
l8 (4,7) 1 {l8, l18, l20, l9, l19} 54.8451 
l9 (4,9) 3 {l9, l18, l20} 24.4149 
l10 (5,6) 1 {l10} 42.0836 
l11 (6,11) 1 {l11, l16} 12.5000 
l12 (6,12) 1 {l12} 7.5451 
l13 (6,13) 1 {l13, l19, l18, l17} 31.2048 
l14 (7,8) 1 {l14} 0 
l15 (7,9) 1 {l15, l18, l20, l9} 53.4000 
l16 (9,10) 2 {l16, l18} 9.0000 
l17 (9,14) 2 {l17, l20} 14.9000 
l18 (10,11) 7 {l18} 2.8048 
l19 (12,13) 3 {l19} 1.4451 
l20 (13,14) 6 {l20} 4.9788 
 
 
5.5.3 Discussion 
This chapter has discussed a new algorithm for assessing different lines of a power 
network in case of failure. A few concepts for electric power transfer capability of lines 
and sensitivity to outages have been introduced. Next, various indices relating to the 
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fragility and robustness of a power networks have been defined. The concepts of CLS 
and CCLS reflect the way transmission lines are related to each other which is significant 
in analyzing the robustness of power systems. An algorithm which calculates the 
correlation of lines in case of failures has been developed based on the DC power flow 
model and it uses the concept of PTDF and LODF. The algorithm has been tested on the 
IEEE 14 bus system and the vulnerable links of the network have been identified. The 
results can be verified by general analysis of the IEEE 14 bus. The index proposed to 
represent the robustness of a power network has been calculated and its importance has 
been discussed. 
 
5.6 SUMMARY 
 It has been demonstrated through the two case studies that the correlation of lines 
varies according to electrical characteristic of the network. It has also been shown, how a 
single failure can lead to a series of outages which could sometimes result in cascades 
and eventual blackouts. Increasing the power delivering capacity of the lines identified as 
important will significantly improve the robustness of the whole system. The approach 
proposed in this study can help to identify and understand the important connections of a 
system which can then be designed and monitored for better system reliability. This gives 
a more practical and economical solution to the problem. 
Fault Location in Power Networks 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 114 
 
 
Chapter 6 
FAULT LOCATION IN POWER NETWORKS 
 
6.1 OVERVIEW 
This chapter studies fault location in power systems using the Complex Network Theory 
along with travelling wave based techniques. The chapter can be broadly classified into 
two parts: fault location in power transmission networks and fault location in radial 
distribution networks. Section 6.2 deals with fault location in transmission networks. 
Initially, some preliminaries of double-ended travelling waves and network modelling 
techniques are introduced. Next, a novel algorithm based on the travelling wave 
techniques and network theory is proposed to identify faulty links and calculate fault 
distance in power transmission networks. Section 6.3 proposes a methodology to isolate 
faults in radial distribution lines using single-ended travelling wave technique together 
with spanning tree search. This section explains some fundamentals of single-ended 
travelling waves and modelling of radial networks. The proposed methodology is verified 
on IEEE 34 node test feeder. Finally, Section 6.2 discusses the results of fault location 
using network theory. 
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6.2 FAULT LOCATION IN TRANSMISSION 
NETWORKS 
Fault location in transmission networks is accomplished by utilizing the existing 
travelling wave theory and signal processing techniques, discussed in detail in Section 
2.6.3 and Section 2.6.4 respectively. The knowledge is combined together with network 
theory and a novel technique is proposed to identify the faulty link and then calculate the 
fault distance in power systems. 
 
6.2.1 Double-Ended Travelling Wave Measurements 
When the travel time of fault transients are recorded at both ends of the transmission line 
then the methodology is called double-ended measurement technique. The GPS 
technology can be used to synchronize the various recording units to get accurate time 
stamps [56]. Double ended methods are expensive but more accurate results can be 
achieved. If we know the length of the transmission line, say L, and the time stamps at the 
two terminals A and B, say Ta and Tb, then the fault distance x from the terminals can be 
calculated as: 
 
2
)( ba
a
TTvL
x
−×+
=  or 
2
)( ab
b
TTvL
x
−×+
=   (6.1) 
Travelling wave fault location methodology is categorized as high frequency 
component based technique. We need high sampling rates and proper signal processing 
tools to be able to filter out the noise and make use of the fault transients. The signals can 
be analyzed in time domain, frequency domain or time-frequency domain and there are 
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various techniques involving these analytical tools. These methodologies have been 
discussed in detail in Section 2.6.4. 
 Time-frequency domain methods are considered to be more suitable for transient 
signals and the most powerful tool among them is wavelet transform. Hence, we have 
utilized these techniques [112][113][114] to process the current and voltage fault 
transients to extract the time stamps at the recording nodes. 
 
6.2.2 Network Model of a Power System with Fault 
A power grid is considered to be a large complex system with nodes and edges and 
modelled as a network using the principles defined in Section 2.3.2. In order to 
incorporate the topology of the network, we put the distance between the nodes as the 
weight on the connection matrix. This is illustrated by a simple example in Figure 6.1. 
  
(a)     (b) 
Figure 6.1 Network Model (a) Original Network (b) Simplified Network with 
Fault 
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Consider part of a large network as shown in Figure 6.1(a) which has fault on one 
of the links. The numbers within the circles represent the node identities and the numbers 
on the edges represent the distance between nodes. The network can be represented using 
a nn ×  adjacency matrix where n is the number of nodes in the system. The node 
distances are used to weight the connection matrix which is represented mathematically 
by Equation (6.2). 
[ ]ijdE =  or 
















=
00740
00605
76023
40200
05300
E   (6.2) 
 
6.2.3 Fault Location Methodology for Transmission Networks 
Let the time recorded by the TWRs for the waves to reach each node be t1, t2…tn which 
are stored in a vector as shown below. 
[ ]ntttt ...21=      (6.3) 
where n is the number of nodes in the network. 
The node which is closest to the fault will record the fastest time, say tk, so we can 
safely mark node k as the first node connected to the faulty line. Based on this 
information and using the connection matrix, we can simplify the network having only 
the nodes connected to node k. This can be done by using the values of kth row of matrix 
E from Equation (6.2). In the example of Figure 6.1(a), node 3 is closest to the fault so 
the simplified network, as shown in Figure 6.1(b), can be modelled using the values of 3rd 
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row of connection matrix from Equation (6.2). The simplified network can be stored in a 
vector as shown below. 
[ ]
nkkkk eeee ...21=     (6.4) 
where 
nke  are elements of k
th
 row of connection matrix E.  
If v is the velocity of the travelling wave, then the distance travelled by the wave to reach 
any node j connected to node k will be: 
vtd jj =       (6.5) 
Distance dj will always be greater than the length of the line connecting node j to 
node k unless it is the actual faulty line. This can be observed in Figure 6.1(b), where the 
distance travelled by the fault transients to reach from fault point to node 1, 2 and 5 are 
greater than the respective line lengths but smaller in case of node 4 (as line 3-4 is the 
faulty line). This can be represented mathematically as jkj dd >  or 0<− jk dd j  for all 
lines except the faulty line. 
Using Equations (6.3), (6.4) and (6.5), we define a fault coefficient vector α  as: 
[ ]




−=
=
)(
...21
vte jkj
n
jα
αααα
    (6.6) 
where jα  are elements of vector α , jke  are elements of vector ke , jt  are elements of 
vector t , v is the wave velocity which is a scalar and j = 1, 2,…, n. The wave velocity v, 
which is close to the speed of light, can be calculated using the line constant program of 
ATP/EMTP [93][94]. From the above argument, the value of jα  will be greater than zero 
only for the faulty link. 
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6.2.4 Algorithm for Fault Location in Transmission Networks 
The fault location technique is divided into two parts: 
 Identifying the faulty line 
 Calculating the fault distance 
In order to fully locate a fault, we have to identify the faulty line first and then calculate 
the fault distance. 
Figure 6.2 illustrates the block diagram of the fault locator. It consists of a 
travelling wave data acquisition unit which records the electromagnetic current and 
voltage transients generated due to the fault. The wave data is transferred to a processing 
unit to extract the time stamps at each node. Next, the travelling wave time is processed 
together with the network topology to locate the fault. The results are displayed by the 
output device. The steps for identifying the faulty link and calculating the fault distance 
are listed in Figure 6.3. 
 
Figure 6.2 Block diagram of Fault Locator for Transmission Networks 
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a) Model the network as defined in previous sections and store the distance between 
nodes in an adjacency matrix E as shown in Equation (6.2). 
b) Store the time recorded for the fault transients to travel to each node in a vector t 
as shown in Equation (6.3). 
c) Mark the node which records the fastest wave travel time as the first node, say k, 
connected to the faulty line. 
d) Remodel the network with only the nodes connected to the node k (identified as 
first node connected to faulty line). This can be done by using the values of kth 
row from the connection adjacency matrix E. 
e) Store the model of step (d) in a vector ek as shown in Equation (6.4). 
f) Calculate the fault coefficient vector α using Equation (6.6). All the values in 
vector α will be negative except for one which will correspond to the second 
node, say j, connected to the faulty line. 
g) From step (c) and (f), identify the line connected to node k and node j as the faulty 
link. 
h) Calculate the fault distance from either node using Equation (6.1). 
Figure 6.3 Algorithm for Fault Location in Transmission Networks 
 
6.2.5 Case Study 
This section describes the application of the methodology explained in the previous 
section. A sample power network with 9 nodes is used as a test case and is modelled and 
simulated in ATP/EMTP. The TWRs record the first fault transient wave reaching each 
node which is further processed using signal processing tools to calculate the travel time. 
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Further, these time stamps are processed together with network topology in MATLAB to 
identify the faulty line and locate the fault. 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Schematic of Test Power System 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Test Power System as a Network 
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Figure 6.4 shows the schematic of a sample power system with TWRs at each node. A 
fault is introduced in the line connecting node 4 and node 5 at a distance of 33.3 km from 
node 4. The system is remodelled as a network which is shown in Figure 6.5. The 
numbers within the circle represent the node number or identity of node and the numbers 
on the edges represent the length of the transmission lines as the weight.  
The time stamps recorded for the travelling wave to reach each node is stored in a 
vector t according to Equation (6.3). 
tj = [470.278  213.297  495.623  113.961  303.728  … 
     … 254.396  312.632  461.357  690.973]      (6.7) 
where j = 1 to 9. The network shown in Figure 6.5 is mathematically represented by a 
99 ×  adjacency matrix E shown in Equation (6.8), which contains the information about 
the connectivity of the network and the length of the transmission lines. 
 As we can see from Equation (6.7), node 4 has the smallest time stamp and hence 
it is marked as the first node connected to the faulty line. Using this information together 
with the network connection matrix, we simplify the network in Figure 6.5 by eliminating 
the nodes which are not connected to node 4. The nodes connected to node 4 can be 
easily extracted as shown in the adjacency matrix in Equation (6.8). 
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The simplified network is represented by a vector as shown in Equation (6.9) and 
further illustrated in Figure 6.6. 
e4 = [0  29  0  0  122  41  58  0  0]     (6.9) 
 
2
4 5
6
7
122
29
41 58
Fault
 
Figure 6.6 Simplified Network after Identifying First Node Connected to Faulty Line 
 
Next, using the simplified network Equation (6.9) and the time stamps recorded in 
Equation (6.7), we calculate the fault coefficient vector α according to Equation (6.6). 
α = [-137.215  -33.235  -144.610  -33.251  +33.380 ... 
        …  -33.226  -33.218  -134.612  -201.608]     (6.10) 
We can clearly see from Equation (6.10) that all the values in vector α are negative 
expect for the value of α5 which is positive. Thus, using the algorithm explained in 
previous sub-section, we conclude that node 5 is the second node connected to the faulty 
line. Hence, the line connected to node 4 and node 5 is identified as faulty. 
 
 
Figure 6.7 Identified Faulty Line 
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Figure 6.7 shows the identified faulty line connected to node 4 and node 5. 
Finally, substituting the values of t and d for the faulty line from Equation (6.7) and 
Equation (6.9) in Equation (6.1), we calculate the fault at a distance of 33.315 km from 
node 4 or 88.685 km from node 5.  
 
6.3 FAULT LOCATION IN RADIAL DISTRIBUTION 
LINES 
6.3.1 Network Theory and Spanning Tree 
As we have learned throughout this thesis, a network can be defined as a set of nodes or 
vertices with connections called links or edges. Further, a spanning tree or tree is a part of 
a graph or a network G such that it contains all vertices and some (or all) edges of the 
original network in such a way that there is a unique path between every pair of the 
vertices and there are no loops or cycles formed. Further, there can be weights associated 
with the links of the network. These weights incorporate some of additional features of 
the system under study apart from the topological characteristics. 
  
 
Figure 6.8 Spanning Tree and Depth First Search 
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Travelling through a network or the flow of information usually happens with an 
alternate sequence of nodes and edges which is defined as path. Depth first search 
[24][99] is one of the algorithms for traversing or searching through a tree structure. We 
select and start at the root node and search to the farthest point in a branch before 
selecting another branch. Figure 6.8 shows an example of a tree structure and the method 
of traversing through the network using depth first search. The numbers within the circles 
give the order in which the nodes are searched. 
 
6.3.2 Single-Ended Travelling Wave Measurements 
When the travel time of fault transients are recorded at one end of the transmission line 
then the methodology is called single-ended measurements technique. These methods are 
cost effective but less accurate compared to double-ended measurements. 
  
 
Figure 6.9 Lattice Diagram for Single-Ended Fault Measurement 
 
 As shown in Figure 6.9, in case of single-ended measurement, the time difference 
)( 23 ttt −=∆  between the initial fault transient and the corresponding reflected surge 
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from fault point is calculated and then the fault distance from the measurement terminal 
can be given as: 
    
2
tv
x
∆
=       (6.11) 
For the purpose of the current study, TWRs are installed at the two ends of the 
radial distribution systems. Whenever there is a fault, current and voltage transients in the 
form of electromagnetic waves are originated at the fault point and travel to the terminals. 
These signals are recorded and processed individually at both ends of system using 
single-ended fault location technique.  
The recorded transients are processed using wavelet transform to extract the time 
information at each node [76]-[79]. The wave velocity v, is calculated using the line 
constant program of ATP/EMTP [93][94]. 
 
6.3.3 Network Model of a Radial System 
Figure 6.10 shows a sample radial network with 12 node and 11 edges. The numbers 
within the circles are the node identities and the number on the edges show the length of 
the connecting links.  
 
Figure 6.10 Sample Radial Network 
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The above network can be modelled mathematically using the adjacency list. If 
there is a connection between nodes i and j then it can be represented as an element (i, j) 
along with the weight wij of the connection. All other nodes which are not connected have 
a weight 0. In the current example, the weight of the connection is the distance between 
the nodes. The complete connection of the sample network has been listed in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1 Network Connection 
Node 
Connections Weights 
 Node 
Connections Weights 
(1,2) 11  (6,8) 14 
(2,3) 7  (8,9) 20 
(3,4) 12  (8,10) 8 
(3,5) 30  (10,11) 19 
(2,6) 12  (10,12) 15 
(6,7) 22  All Others 0 
 
6.3.4 Fault Location Methodology for Distribution Networks 
 
Figure 6.11 Block Diagram of Fault Locator for Distribution Networks 
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Figure 6.11 illustrates the block diagram of the fault locator for distribution 
networks. It consists of two travelling wave data acquisition units at the two ends of the 
radial network which record the electromagnetic current and voltage transients generated 
due to the fault. The wave data is analyzed using wavelet transform to extract the time 
stamps and calculate the fault distance. Next, different fault candidates are isolated using 
depth first search from both ends. The candidate which is common in both the searches is 
output and the faulty link. 
 Although the fault distance can be calculated from any one end but due to the 
radial structure of the network, there could be multiple fault candidates at the same 
distance from the measurement node. If x is the calculated fault distance then the 
flowchart in Figure 6.12 explains the algorithm to identify and isolate all possible fault 
candidates. 
 
6.3.5 Algorithm for Fault Location in Distribution Networks 
As explained in the previous section, the calculation of faults in radial distribution 
systems can result in multiple fault candidates. However, the actual fault point can be 
isolated from the pseudo ones by performing a search operation from both ends. Due to 
the asymmetrical nature of such networks, only the real fault point will be common in 
both the searches. Fault location in a radial network can be broadly classified into two 
parts: 
 Calculating the fault distance which is done using travelling wave theory. 
 Identifying the faulty link which is done using network theory. 
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Advance to a new adjacent node
Sum = Sum + Lf
(Lf is length of link traversed 
forward)
Is Sum > x
Record Last link added as a fault 
candidate
Back track to previous nodes 
until adjacent node found
Sum = Sum – Lb
(Lb is length traversed back)
Yes
No
All adjacent nodes 
traversed
Calculated Fault 
Distance = x
Sum = 0
Output fault 
candidates
Yes
No
 
Figure 6.12 Algorithm to Calculate Fault Candidates 
 
The total fault location methodology can be summarized as below: 
a) Model the radial system as a network and store the topology and distance between 
nodes in an adjacency list as shown in Table 6.1. 
b) Time stamps are recorded individually at the two ends of the radial system using 
single-ended travelling wave measurement. 
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c) Calculate the distance of the fault from one end of the network using Equation 
(6.11). 
d) Use depth first search to isolate all the possible fault candidates from the 
measurement node of the network.  
e) Calculate the fault distance from the other end of the network as in step (c). 
f) Use the depth first search to isolate all possible candidates from the other end of 
the network. 
g) Due to the unsymmetrical structure of the network, there will be only one 
common fault point among the list of fault candidates resulting from the two 
searches in step (d) and (f). This common candidate will be the actual faulty link. 
Figure 6.13 Algorithm for Fault Location in Distribution Networks 
 
6.3.6 Fault Location in a Sample Radial Network 
In order to further illustrate the above listed fault location methodology, a fault is 
introduced between node 8 and node 9 in the sample network of Figure 6.10. The 
travelling wave recorders at the two ends of the network record the fault transients which 
are analyzed to calculate the time stamps at the two ends and further used to calculate the 
fault distance. The fault distance from node 1 is 43 units and from node 12 is 29 units. 
Although the fault distance from node 1 is calculated but due to the radial 
structure of the network, there are more than one fault candidates (links) at the calculated 
distance. In order to search the fault candidates we take advantage of the unsymmetrical 
tree structure of the network and use depth first search. The process has been illustrated 
in Figure 6.14, where the numbers within circles are node identities and numbers outside 
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give the search order. As marked in Figure 6.14, there are four fault candidates, which are 
on links (3, 5), (6, 7), (8, 9) and (8, 10), searched from node 1. 
 
 
Figure 6.14 Search for Fault Candidates from Node 1 
 
In a similar manner, as shown in Figure 6.15, we calculate the distance of the fault 
point from the other end of the network and search for all possible fault candidates. As 
marked in Figure 6.15, three fault candidates are found from node 12, which are on links 
(10, 11), (8, 9) and (8, 6). We can clearly see that fault on line (8, 9) is the common 
candidate in both the searches and hence it is the actual fault point. 
 
Fault 
Candidate
1
1 2 6 8 10 12
3
4
5
7
9
11
6 5
4
3
2
12
11
10
7
8
9
 
Figure 6.15 Search for Fault Candidates from Node 12 
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6.3.7 Case Study 
Figure 6.16 shows the one line diagram of the IEEE 34 node test feeder [115] with 
TWRs. The two TWRs record the fault transient waves reaching the nodes, which are 
further processed using wavelet transform to calculate the wave arrival time at each end. 
 
Figure 6.16 IEEE 34 Node Test Feeder 
 
The wave arrival time is used to calculate the fault distance from the two ends 
respectively. Due to the radial structure of the network, there are more than one fault 
candidates at the calculated distance. This ambiguity is resolved by using the network 
topology and doing a search from the two ends as explained in the previous sub-sections. 
In three different cases, faults are introduced in different parts of the network and 
the proposed methodology is applied to calculate the fault distance and identify the faulty 
link. The results are tabulated in Table 6.2 (a), (b) and (c). X1 is the fault distance 
calculated from TWR 1 and X2 is the fault distance calculated form TWR 2.  
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Table 6.2 (a). Identification of Faulty Link (Case I) 
Case I: A fault is introduced at 116500 feet from TWR1 on the line connecting node 
828 and node 830 i.e. link (828, 830) 
Fault distance calculated using single-
ended travelling wave measurement from 
TWR1 X1 = 116372 feet 
Fault distance calculated using single-
ended travelling wave measurement from 
TWR2 X2 = 72677 feet 
Fault candidates identified using depth 
first search at a distance of X1 from 
TWR1 are on links (828, 830), (824, 826) 
and (818, 820) 
Fault candidates identified using depth 
first search at a distance of X2 from 
TWR2 are on links (830, 828) and (854, 
856) 
Since the fault point on line connecting node 828 and node 830 is common among the 
fault candidates searched from TWR1 and TWR2 respectively, so the output faulty 
link is (828, 830). 
 
Table 6.2 (b). Identification of Faulty Link (Case II) 
Case II: A fault is introduced at 12390 feet from TWR2 on the line connecting node 
858 and node 864 i.e. link (858, 864) 
Fault distance calculated using single-
ended travelling wave measurement from 
TWR1 X1 = 178589 feet 
Fault distance calculated using single-
ended travelling wave measurement from 
TWR2 X2 = 12383 feet 
Fault candidates identified using depth 
first search at a distance of X1 from 
TWR1 are on links (858, 834), (858, 864) 
and (888, 890) 
Fault candidates identified using depth 
first search at a distance of X2 from 
TWR2 are on links (858, 832) and (858, 
864) 
Since the fault point on line connecting node 858 and node 864 is common among the 
fault candidates searched from TWR1 and TWR2 respectively, so the output faulty 
link is (858, 864). 
 
Table 6.2 (c). Identification of Faulty Link (Case III) 
Case III: A fault is introduced at 23290 feet from TWR2 on the line connecting node 
888 and node 890 i.e. link (888, 890) 
Fault distance calculated using single-
ended travelling wave measurement from 
TWR1 X1 = 179670 feet 
Fault distance calculated using single-
ended travelling wave measurement from 
TWR2 X2 = 23276 feet 
Fault candidates identified using depth 
first search at a distance of X1 from 
TWR1 are on links (858, 834) and (888, 
890) 
Fault candidates identified using depth 
first search at a distance of X2 from 
TWR2 are on links (852, 854) and (888, 
890) 
Since the fault point on line connecting node 888 and node 890 is common among the 
fault candidates searched from TWR1 and TWR2 respectively, so the output faulty 
link is (888, 890). 
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The length of the transmission lines were given in feet, so the fault distances are 
calculated in feet. The calculated fault distance has been rounded to nearest integer. All 
the identified fault candidates and the actual faulty links have been listed in the table. 
 
6.4 DISCUSSION 
In the previous chapters, we have seen the applications of the Complex Network Theory 
for modelling and assessment of vulnerability and cascading failures in power systems. 
The current work further bridges the gap between the network science and the power 
system research by extending its applications in fault location. It adds knowledge to the 
existing fault location techniques by integrating the principles of CNT and utilizing them 
for identifying faulty links and locating faults. The knowledge of network science is used 
together with travelling wave based fault location methodology to propose new 
techniques to identify the actual faults. The applications have been extended to both 
power transmission network and radial distribution networks. 
 In the first part, faulty link in a mesh network of transmission system is identified 
and then the fault distance is calculated. The method involves modelling a power system 
as a network, where sub-stations are modelled as nodes and transmission lines as the 
edges. The length of the transmission lines are used to weight the connection matrix in 
order to incorporate the topology of the network. Further, electromagnetic transients 
originating at the fault point are recorded at each node and travel time is processed is 
using signal processing tools. Next, these time stamps are used together with the network 
topology to first identify the faulty link and then calculate the fault distance from any one 
node. 
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Since, we consider the travelling wave data at the nodes closest to the fault so 
distance calculation results are very good. As the waves travel to far away nodes, the 
chance of introducing error is more due to attenuation and distortion of signals. Although, 
this methodology identifies the faulty link accurately and calculates the fault distance 
with precision but it requires the measurement of time stamps for travelling waves at 
every node which could be an expensive solution. One of the important improvements 
would be to optimize the use of travelling wave recorders based on the network topology. 
Moreover, the methodology can be extended to locate faults if there are branches between 
the nodes identified as faulty section. 
The second part has extended the principles to locate faults in radial distribution 
systems. Single-ended measurements are done from the two ends of the radial network 
and fault distances are calculated respectively using travelling wave theory. Due to the 
radial structure of the network, there could be more than one fault candidates in the 
calculation. In order to resolve this ambiguity, the network is modelled as a spanning tree 
and depth first search is done to identify the multiple fault candidates from both ends. 
Due to the unsymmetrical structure of the network, there will be only common fault 
candidate searched from each end. This common candidate is identified as the actual 
faulty link. The proposed methodology has been demonstrated and validated on the IEEE 
34 node test feeder.  
 Although, the proposed methodologies identify the faulty links accurately but if 
the fault is very close to the node or on a link with very small length then the output 
result might be erroneous. Further, the errors are higher in single-ended travelling wave 
measurement scheme as compared to double-ended measurements. Moreover, at this 
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stage, only one fault at a time has been taken into account. The modelling, simulations 
and calculations are done using ATP/EMTP and Matlab. 
 
6.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter has introduced some of the fundamentals of travelling wave theory and its 
applications in fault location. It has also discussed the techniques to model transmission 
networks and radial systems as networks in separate instances. An algorithm has been 
proposed to identify the faulty links and then calculate the fault distance in the mesh 
network of transmission system. Finally, another novel methodology has been proposed 
to identify and isolate the actual fault in radial distribution system using the network 
spanning trees. 
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
7.1 OVERVIEW 
This chapter summarizes the whole work and gives an overall picture of the research 
undertaken and results achieved. Section 7.2 gives an overall conclusion and outlines the 
results of this thesis. Finally, Section 7.3 concludes the thesis with some 
recommendations for future research directions. 
 
7.2 CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has demonstrated that, in every power system, there are a few lines which are 
more important than others. If those lines fail or are attacked then the efficiency of the 
system drops considerably where as other less important lines do not have much impact 
on its performance. It has also been shown that if the critical lines fail then there is a huge 
shift of power to the adjacent lines which might fail in turn if it exceeds their capacity, 
causing further load shift and failure. This could eventually lead to cascading failure and 
serious blackouts. The cascading failures have been further assessed and analyzed using 
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network theory, in which attempts have been made to predict the group of lines which 
could be affected in case of any outages and the sequence in which they might fail. This 
also helps to predict the critical lines and the depth to which any failure may penetrate in 
case of cascades. Overall, it can be concluded that, it is important to identify such 
vulnerable elements to be able to focus more resources on them and monitor them to 
enhance system security and reliability. 
This research has also demonstrated that the Complex Network Theory can be 
applied for fault location on power lines. The computation of impedances and travelling 
waves is heavily reliant on the topological structure of the power networks. For example, 
in the impedance based approach, there may be multiple solutions satisfying the same 
impedance condition, which would make it very difficult to identify the most likely 
faulted node or line in a large geographical area, making repairs and services very hard. 
By using the topological structure information of the power networks, the problem to 
identify such faulted lines can be resolved more easily. Hence, some of the conventional 
fault location methodologies using travelling wave based techniques have been integrated 
with network science to locate faults in power networks. The applications have been 
extended to power transmission systems as well as radial distribution lines.  
The major results and contribution of this research can be summarized as below: 
 A new betweenness index has been proposed based on the shortest path 
betweenness approach. Reactance has been used as an index of amount of power 
flowing through any transmission lines under lossless conditions. The lines which 
are used more often in transferring power between different nodes are identified 
as important. 
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 A centrality index based on the maximum flow based approach has been proposed 
to analyze the vulnerability of power networks. For power systems, the shortest 
path approach may not be the best to define its dynamics. So, in this study a 
power network is modelled as directed and capacitated and maximum flow 
algorithm is used to calculate the contribution of each line is transferring power 
from generators to loads. The lines which carry higher portion of the total flow 
are classified as more important. 
 In another work, cascading failures have been studied for power networks. The 
concepts of power transfer distribution factor (PTDF) and line outage distribution 
factor (LODF) have been used together with network topology to predict the 
group of lines which might fail if one or more of them fail. It explains how 
cascading failure propagates through a network. 
 A new algorithm has been proposed to locate faults in power transmission 
networks using network theory. Travelling wave based theory has been used to 
get the fault transient arrival time at different nodes and then those time stamps 
are used together with the network topology to identify the fault link and finally 
calculate the fault distance. 
 Finally, a novel technique has been proposed to locate faults in radial power 
distribution networks. Single-ended travelling wave theory has been used to 
calculate the distance of the fault from the terminals but due to the radial structure 
of the network, there can be more than one fault candidates in the calculation. 
This ambiguity has been resolved using the spanning tree like structure of the 
network and applying the depth first search to identify the actual faulty link. 
Conclusions and Future Research 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 140 
7.3 FUTURE RESEARCH SCOPE 
Finally, a few future research directions are listed below before concluding this thesis: 
 In the power flow model used to study the shortest path betweenness approach, 
parameters such as voltage, phase angle and resistance, have been ignored in the 
study in order to simplify the problem at hand. A better power flow analysis with 
some or all the above parameters of the line is needed to help produce a better 
betweenness index. 
 In the maximum flow based centrality approach for assessing the vulnerability, a 
more sophisticated network model can be generated by solving a set of network 
equations to calculate the actual current through the individual links, rather than 
using their admittance as the sole measure of power flow. 
 Additionally, in the above approach, the power network has been studied in a 
steady state. One of the interesting things would be to try and include some 
dynamics within the nodes of the network to make it closer to a real power 
system. 
 There are other centrality measurements such as ‘centrality based on random 
walks’ which have not been explored in this study. It would be interesting to 
consider other centrality indices and do a comparison of results. 
 The central idea of vulnerability analysis in this thesis is to identify the critical 
lines of the system and check the impact on the performance of the network if 
they are removed. It would be interesting to explore if the robustness of the 
system can be increased by adding links to it. There have been similar research in 
other complex systems using dominant Eigen-values [116][117]. 
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 The vulnerability analysis studies have only been conducted on IEEE standard 
bus systems. It would be interesting to apply the proposed methodologies to real 
world power networks and also do a comparison for different topologies in 
various countries. 
 The methodology proposed for locating faults in power transmission networks 
requires the measurement of time stamps for travelling waves at every node which 
could be an expensive solution for practical cases. It would be worth exploring 
and optimizing the use of travelling wave recorders based on the network 
topology. 
 The current methodologies proposed for fault location using the Complex 
Network Theory only take one fault into account. The possibility of detecting and 
locating multiple faults can be studied in future. 
 The fault location techniques proposed for power transmission and distribution 
networks have only been demonstrated via simulation models. One of the future 
tasks would be to optimize and validate the methodologies on real networks. 
 
7.4 SUMMARY 
In summary, a power system is very dynamic in nature and extremely complicated, so it 
is difficult to consider all the electrical and topological properties at the same time. 
However, this thesis gives a new direction to the use of CNT in power system research, 
which will improve structural vulnerability assessment and fault location techniques. The 
overall goal of applying the Complex Network Theory in solving a few problems of 
vulnerability analysis and fault location in power systems has been achieved. 
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